SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hummel, Patrick; Knight, Brian
• 署名单位: Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Brown University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12124
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 851-887
• 关键词: new-hampshire; presidential nominations; primaries; momentum; INFORMATION; Campaigns; cascades; BEHAVIOR; MODEL

摘要

Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Simultaneous elections equally weigh states but place too much weight on voter priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front-runners. Simultaneous elections are thus preferred if the front-runner advantage is small, but sequential elections are preferred if the advantage is large. Our quantitative welfare analysis of presidential primaries suggests that simultaneous systems slightly outperform sequential systems.