RULE RATIONALITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heller, Yuval; Winter, Eyal
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12183
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 997-1026
• 关键词: multiple games; equilibrium; INFORMATION; reputation; imperfect; STABILITY; DYNAMICS; MARKET; thumb

摘要

We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and Stackelberg stability (no player can earn from playing first).