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作者：Ma, Chao
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：Investigating a unique large data set, we find that automobile insurance policyholders are more likely to encounter accidents during the last month of the insurance policy term than during any other month. Our interpretation is that this effect is driven by the sunk cost fallacy held by policyholders, which exacerbates their moral hazard. The explanation is that in the last month, policyholders may become concerned that they may waste the premiums paid upfront if they have not encountered an a...
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作者：Coughlin, Cletus C.; Novy, Dennis
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; University of Warwick
摘要：Trade data are typically aggregated across space. In this article, we investigate the sensitivity of gravity estimation to spatial aggregation. We build a model in which micro regions are aggregated into macro regions. We then apply the model to the large literature on border effects in domestic and international trade. Our theory shows that aggregation leads to border effect heterogeneity. Larger regions and countries are systematically associated with smaller border effects. We test our theo...
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作者：Griffy, Benjamin S.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：I study how initial wealth affects lifetime earnings inequality when labor markets are frictional. To do this, I construct a model life-cycle model with search frictions, incomplete markets, and endogenous human capital accumulation. In the model, incomplete markets prevent low-wealth workers from smoothing consumption, causing them to accept low pay jobs while unemployed. In anticipation, they build savings instead of human capital while employed. This amplifies the importance of initial weal...
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作者：Anagnostopoulos, Alexis; Carceles-Poveda, Eva; Tauman, Yair
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Reichman University
摘要：We propose endogenous, value preserving (VP) welfare weights as an alternative to equal weights utilitarianism. VP weights require that the contribution of an agent's endowments to social welfare is proportional to the contribution of the final allocation to his welfare. Under three axioms, the per unit contribution of a good to welfare is shown to equal the gradient of the welfare function. VP weights coincide with Negishi weights in frictionless environments but prescribe redistribution towa...
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作者：Ronayne, David
摘要：The large and growing industry of price comparison websites (PCWs) or web aggregators is poised to benefit consumers by increasing competitive pricing pressure on firms by acquainting shoppers with more prices. However, these sites also charge firms for sales, which feeds back to raise prices. I find that introducing any number of PCWs to a market increases prices for all consumers, both those who use the sites, and those who do not. I then use my framework to identify ways in which a more com...
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作者：Zhang, Daiqiang
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：This article provides identification and estimation methods for a model of contracting with externalities and imperfect information. In this model, one principal offers a contract of trade quantity to each of multiple agents, and the negotiated payment for each agent is determined via Nash bargaining. Beliefs matter due to the privacy of bilateral contracting and the externalities from the dependence of each agent's payoff on all agents' trade quantities. We provide a test to determine whether...
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作者：Kovacs, Agnes; Low, Hamish; Moran, Patrick
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Oxford; University of Copenhagen
摘要：This article estimates the importance of temptation for consumption smoothing and asset accumulation in a life-cycle model. We use two complementary estimation strategies: first, we estimate the model-implied Euler equation; second, we match liquid and illiquid wealth accumulation using the method of simulated moments. In both cases, we find that the utility cost of temptation is one-quarter of the utility benefit of consumption. Further, temptation is crucial for correctly estimating the elas...
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作者：Kotlikoff, Laurence; Kubler, Felix; Polbin, Andrey; Sachs, Jeffrey; Scheidegger, Simon
作者单位：Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Zurich; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy & Public Administration; Columbia University; University of Lausanne
摘要：Carbon taxation is mostly studied in social planner or infinitely lived-agent models, which obscure carbon taxation's potential to produce a generational win win. This article's large-scale, dynamic 55-period, overlapping generations model calculates the carbon tax policy delivering the highest uniform welfare gain to all current and future generations. Our model features coal, oil, and gas, increasing extraction costs, clean energy, technical and demographic change, and Nordhaus' carbon/tempe...
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作者：Levine, David K.; Mattozzi, Andrea; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Palermo
摘要：The relevance of special interests lobbying in modern democracies can hardly be questioned. But if large trade associations can overcome the free riding problem and form effective lobbies, why do they not also threaten market competition by forming equally effective cartels? We argue that the key to understanding the difference lies in supply elasticity. The group discipline, which works in the case of lobbying, can be effective in sustaining a cartel only if increasing output is sufficiently ...
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作者：Harrison, Rodrigo; Jara-Moroni, Pedro
作者单位：Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; Universidad de Santiago de Chile
摘要：We study global games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a class of binary-action,N-player games with strategic substitutes, we prove that under payoff asymmetry, as incomplete information vanishes, the global games approach selects a unique equilibrium. We characterize this equilibrium profile ; players employ switching strategies at different cutoff signals, the order of which is directly determined by payoff asymmetry. We provide examples that illustrate our result and its connec...
