MAKING CARBON TAXATION A GENERATIONAL WIN WIN

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kotlikoff, Laurence; Kubler, Felix; Polbin, Andrey; Sachs, Jeffrey; Scheidegger, Simon
• 署名单位: Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Zurich; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy & Public Administration; Columbia University; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12483
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3-46
• 关键词: endogenous technological-change; general-equilibrium-model; overlapping generations; CLIMATE-CHANGE; intergenerational equity; competitive equilibria; Tax reforms; POLICY; ECONOMICS; GROWTH

摘要

Carbon taxation is mostly studied in social planner or infinitely lived-agent models, which obscure carbon taxation's potential to produce a generational win win. This article's large-scale, dynamic 55-period, overlapping generations model calculates the carbon tax policy delivering the highest uniform welfare gain to all current and future generations. Our model features coal, oil, and gas, increasing extraction costs, clean energy, technical and demographic change, and Nordhaus' carbon/temperature/damage functions. Assuming high-end carbon damages, the optimal carbon tax is $70, rising annually at 1.5%. This policy raises all generations' welfare by almost 5%. However, doing so requires major intergenerational redistribution.