TESTING PASSIVE VERSUS SYMMETRIC BELIEFS IN CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNALITIES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Daiqiang
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12492
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 723-767
• 关键词: nonparametric-estimation; vertical integration; COMPETITION; prices; TRANSPARENCY; incentives; identification; INNOVATION; inference; selection

摘要

This article provides identification and estimation methods for a model of contracting with externalities and imperfect information. In this model, one principal offers a contract of trade quantity to each of multiple agents, and the negotiated payment for each agent is determined via Nash bargaining. Beliefs matter due to the privacy of bilateral contracting and the externalities from the dependence of each agent's payoff on all agents' trade quantities. We provide a test to determine whether passive or symmetric beliefs fit a given data set better. The empirical results suggest the relevance of adopting the correct beliefs for policy evaluations.