TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: WHY NOT CARTELS?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levine, David K.; Mattozzi, Andrea; Modica, Salvatore
• 署名单位: European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Palermo
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12487
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 47-64
• 关键词: price; collusion; number; COMMUNICATION; incentives; capacity; players; size

摘要

The relevance of special interests lobbying in modern democracies can hardly be questioned. But if large trade associations can overcome the free riding problem and form effective lobbies, why do they not also threaten market competition by forming equally effective cartels? We argue that the key to understanding the difference lies in supply elasticity. The group discipline, which works in the case of lobbying, can be effective in sustaining a cartel only if increasing output is sufficiently costly-otherwise the incentive to deviate is too great. The theory helps organizing a number of stylized facts within a common framework.