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作者：Elliott, Matthew; Talamas, Eduard
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：Agents make noncontractible investments before bargaining over who matches with whom and their terms of trade. An agent is a price taker when her investments do not change her potential partners' payoffs. This incentivizes socially optimal investments. Across a variety of noncooperative bargaining models featuring dynamic entry, we show that everyone necessarily becomes a price taker as the discount factor goes to 1 if there is a minimal amount of competition always present in the market. If t...
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作者：Santacreu, Ana Maria; Sposi, Michael; Zhang, Jing
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Southern Methodist University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：We develop a structural framework to identify the sources of cross-state heterogeneity in response to U.S. tariff changes. A unilateral 25-percentage-point U.S. tariff increase across sectors induces consumption changes ranging from -0.8% in Oregon to 2.3% in Montana. This variation stems from the interaction between states' internal comparative advantage and the nation's external comparative advantage. Factor mobility lowers aggregate consumption and reshapes the cross-state impacts by shifti...
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作者：Boar, Corina; Knowles, Matthew; Storesletten, Kjetil; Wang, Yicheng
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作者：Hwang, Sung-ha; Neary, Philip R.; Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Kyoto University; University of Tsukuba
摘要：This paper investigates strategic dynamics under the behavioral rule of pairwise interact and imitate (PII), which requires minimal information and emphasizes outperforming opponents in pairwise interactions. We characterize PII using weak tournament graphs and, for a broad class of dynamics, establish a one-shot stability result for stochastic stability. Applications include Cournot competition, strategic complements and substitutes, externalities, Nash demand games, and status-seeking contes...
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作者：Czura, Kristina; John, Anett; Spantig, Lisa
作者单位：University of Groningen; University of Birmingham; RWTH Aachen University; University of Essex
摘要：Flexible repayment benefits borrowers, but practitioners fear increased moral hazard. Investigating their concerns requires disentangling repayment choices from repayment capacity, which is typically infeasible in field studies. We use a lab-in-the-field experiment with 645 microcredit borrowers to cleanly identify the effect of repayment flexibility on moral hazard. We also quantify social pressure. Payoff maximization predicts low repayment in our rigid benchmark contract, and increased repa...
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作者：Andreoli, Francesco; Faure, Mathieu; Gravel, Nicolas; Kundu, Tista
作者单位：University of Verona; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Christ University
摘要：This paper provides a robust criterion for comparing lists of probability distributions-interpreted as allocations of opportunities-faced by different social groups. We axiomatically argue in favor of comparing those lists of probability distributions on the basis of a uniform-among groups-valuation of their expected utility. We identify an empirically implementable criterion for comparing allocations of opportunities that coincides with the unanimity of all such uniform valuations of expected...
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作者：Pycia, Marek; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：University of Zurich; Boston College
摘要：In environments without transfers, market designers usually restrict attention to ordinal mechanisms. Ordinal mechanisms are simpler but miss potentially welfare-relevant information. Under what conditions is it without loss to focus on ordinal mechanisms? We show that all group strategy-proof mechanisms are ordinal. While not all Pareto efficient mechanisms are ordinal, all mechanisms maximizing an Arrovian social welfare function must be. These results accommodate feasibility constraints and...
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作者：Gong, Yifan; Stinebrickner, Todd; Stinebrickner, Ralph; Yao, Yuxi
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We examine the initial postcollege geographic location decisions of students from low-income backgrounds, focusing on the role of nonpecuniary considerations. Novel survey questions, in the spirit of the contingent valuation approach, allow us to characterize the full nonpecuniary benefits of each relevant location in dollar equivalents. Supplementing data on perceived location choice probabilities and wage expectations with our nonpecuniary measures allows us to estimate a stylized location c...
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作者：Phelan, Thomas
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：In this article, I study the optimality of differential asset taxation in an environment with entrepreneurs and workers in which output is stochastic and entrepreneurs can misreport profits and abscond with capital. I show that a stationary efficient allocation may be implemented as an equilibrium with endogenous collateral constraints, transfers to newborns, and linear taxes on profits, investment, and interest. Furthermore, these taxes differ from one another and serve distinct purposes. The...
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作者：Macaulay, Alistair; Shi, Chenchuan
作者单位：University of Surrey; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper studies how wealth and aging affect portfolio choices in a life-cycle model with ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion implies wealthier and older agents are endogenously more optimistic about risky asset returns, relative to poorer/younger agents. As life expectancy grows, old agents become even more optimistic, while young agents become more pessimistic, amplifying age gaps in portfolio composition. We find evidence for the mechanism in survey data on portfolios and subjective li...
