Pairwise Imitation and Tournament Graphs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hwang, Sung-ha; Neary, Philip R.; Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji
• 署名单位: Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Kyoto University; University of Tsukuba
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.70059
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Dominated strategies; stochastic stability; evolutionary games; Homo moralis; DYNAMICS; selection; oligopoly; INFORMATION; equilibria; cournot

摘要

This paper investigates strategic dynamics under the behavioral rule of pairwise interact and imitate (PII), which requires minimal information and emphasizes outperforming opponents in pairwise interactions. We characterize PII using weak tournament graphs and, for a broad class of dynamics, establish a one-shot stability result for stochastic stability. Applications include Cournot competition, strategic complements and substitutes, externalities, Nash demand games, and status-seeking contests. The analysis highlights the competing roles of spite effects and perturbations in favoring relative success versus efficiency.