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作者：van der Klaauw, W
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：An important problem faced by colleges and universities, that of evaluating the effect of their financial aid offers on student enrollment decisions, is complicated by the likely endogencity of the aid offer variable in a student enrollment equation. This article shows how discontinuities in an East Coast college's aid assignment rule can be exploited to obtain credible estimates of the aid effect without having to rely on arbitrary exclusion restrictions and functional form assumptions. Semip...
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作者：Armantier, O
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：In the application of auction theory to the real world, practitioners must choose ex ante which of the common value or the private values paradigm applies. Since intuition may fail, some authors have proposed to decide statistically between the two models. These studies, however, did not confirm whether the tests validated the true model since field data were used. I propose to use experimental data as well as Monte-Carlo simulations to study different nonstructural rules to decide between the...
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作者：Kocherlakota, N
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：In this article, I consider environments in which all shocks have finite support and any transfer of resources is ex post voluntary. Consider an allocation that is achievable when potential trading partners know each others' histories. The one-money theorem says that the allocation is achievable using only one money if that money is divisible and money holdings are observable. The two-money theorem says that the allocation is achievable using two divisible monies, even if money holdings are co...
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作者：Goh, AT; Olivier, J
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This article addresses the issue of optimal patent protection in an economy with a downstream and an upstream sector. The key insight is that higher patent protection in the downstream sector raises the incentives of agents to do R&D in that sector but discourages innovation in the upstream sector because of a market size effect. Hence, higher patent protection in the upstream sector accelerates growth whereas higher patent protection in the downstream sector slows it down. If some innovation ...
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作者：Choi, JP
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：This article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant-back clause can mitigate this distortion. I also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant-back clauses may adver...
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作者：Capra, CM; Goeree, JK; Gomez, R; Holt, CA
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga; University of Amsterdam; Washington & Lee University
摘要：We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. The high-price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high-price firm's market share varies. The model accurately p...
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作者：Jeong, B
作者单位：Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：I present a model economy where policy uncertainty creates short-term bias in investment and leads to a higher capital price and lower long-run investment and output. I conduct a calibration exercise using a set of industry-level investment data across countries. Between the lowest-income and the highest-income countries, policy uncertainty can account for capital price and investment-level differences by a factor of about 3 and for the output-level difference by a factor of about 2.
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作者：Daniel, BC
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：An exchange rate crisis is caused when the fiscal authority lots the present value of primary surpluses, inclusive of seigniorage, deviate from the value of government debt at the pegged exchange rate. In the absence of long-term government bonds, the exchange rate collapse must be instantaneous. With longterm government bonds, the collapse can be delayed at the discretion of the monetary authority. Fiscal policy is responsible for the inevitability of a crisis, while monetary policy determine...
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作者：Karp, L; Sacheti, S; Zhao, JH
作者单位：Iowa State University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We use a North-South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto-dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is quite resilient. Trade may cause an environmentally poor country to drag down its richer trading partner, when they degrade their stocks which would be preserved under autarky. It may enable the environme...
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作者：Gresik, TA; Mansley, EC
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Centers for Disease Control & Prevention - USA
摘要：We study a duopoly game in which firms commit to a batch technology before competing in sales quantities. Adopting a batch technology requires the quantity produced to equal an integer number of batches and allows sales to be less than production. When larger batch sizes lower unit production costs (as in the U.S. airline industry with its economics of density), subgame perfect equilibrium sales quantities are unique and more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium quantities of a one-shot ga...
