A dynamic analysis of licensing: The boomerang effect and grant-back clauses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Choi, JP
• 署名单位: Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00036
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 803-829
• 关键词: research-and-development; technology-transfer; moral hazard; INNOVATION

摘要

This article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant-back clause can mitigate this distortion. I also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant-back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee's incentive to engage in R&D and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.