The strategic effects of batch processing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gresik, TA; Mansley, EC
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame; Centers for Disease Control & Prevention - USA
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00130
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 697-728
• 关键词: unit quantity discounts; optimal selling price; airline industry; lot size; TECHNOLOGY; oligopoly; COMPETITION; economies; density

摘要

We study a duopoly game in which firms commit to a batch technology before competing in sales quantities. Adopting a batch technology requires the quantity produced to equal an integer number of batches and allows sales to be less than production. When larger batch sizes lower unit production costs (as in the U.S. airline industry with its economics of density), subgame perfect equilibrium sales quantities are unique and more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium quantities of a one-shot game with continuous total cost functions. When larger batch sizes yield higher unit costs, equilibrium production can exceed equilibrium sales.