The two-money theorem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kocherlakota, N
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 333-346
• 关键词: money; search; MODEL

摘要

In this article, I consider environments in which all shocks have finite support and any transfer of resources is ex post voluntary. Consider an allocation that is achievable when potential trading partners know each others' histories. The one-money theorem says that the allocation is achievable using only one money if that money is divisible and money holdings are observable. The two-money theorem says that the allocation is achievable using two divisible monies, even if money holdings are concealable.