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作者:Bouet, Antoine; Laborde, David; Martimort, David
作者单位:Paris School of Economics; CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
摘要:We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of 'behind-the-border' policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home's supply is contracted, causing trade, and motivating the use of tariffs. Eliminating those instruments by means of a trade agreement may become impossible once Home has also private information on its redistributive concerns...
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作者:Campbell, Arthur
作者单位:Monash University
摘要:An important task for organisations is establishing truthful communication between parties with differing interests. This task is made particularly challenging when the accuracy of the information is poorly observed or not at all. In these settings, incentive contracts based on the accuracy of information will not be very effective. This paper considers an alternative mechanism that does not require any signal of the accuracy of any information communicated to provide incentives for truthful c...
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作者:John, Andrew; Ozgur, Onur
摘要:The emergence of language is one of the defining events of the human race. The subsequent development and evolution of languages, over the long sweep of history, reflect political, military, cultural, social and economic forces. The current article offers a highly parsimonious theoretical explanation of the endogenous creation and destruction of distinct languages, focusing purely on the interaction of economic and linguistic forces. Specifically, the article presents an endogenous growth mode...
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作者:Bircan, Cagatay; Saka, Orkun
作者单位:European Bank of Reconstructon & Development; University of Sussex; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:We document a strong political cycle in bank credit and industry outcomes in Turkey. In line with theories of tactical redistribution, state-owned banks systematically adjust their lending around local elections compared with private banks in the same province based on electoral competition and political alignment of incumbent mayors. This effect only exists in corporate lending and creates credit constraints for firms in opposition areas, which suffer drops in assets, employment and sales but...
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作者:Testa, Patrick A.
作者单位:Tulane University
摘要:This article examines the long-run effects of forced migration on economic development in the origin economy, using Czechoslovakia's expulsion of three million Germans after WWII. For identification, I use the discontinuity in ethnic composition at the border of the Sudetenland region where Germans lived. Germans had similar characteristics to Czechs, bypassing factors driving effects in other cases of forced migration, such as differences in human capital. The expulsion produced persistent di...
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作者:Bingley, Paul; Cappellari, Lorenzo; Tatsiramos, Konstantinos
作者单位:Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Luxembourg
摘要:Using administrative data for the population of Danish men and women, we develop an empirical model which accounts for the joint earnings dynamics of siblings and youth community peers. We provide the first decomposition of the sibling correlation of permanent earnings into family and community effects allowing for life-cycle dynamics and extending the analysis to consider other outcomes. We find that family is the most important factor influencing sibling correlations of earnings, education a...
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作者:Fu, Shihe; Viard, V. Brian; Zhang, Peng
作者单位:The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Shenzhen Research Institute of Big Data
摘要:We provide nationwide causal estimates of air pollution's effect on short-run productivity for China's manufacturing sector from 1998 to 2007. Using thermal inversions as an instrument, a 1 mu g/m(3) decrease in PM2.5 increases productivity by 0.82% (elasticity of -0.44). Increased hiring attenuates the elasticity to -0.17. Differential effects of a trade shock on coastal versus inner regions imply a pollution elasticity of output of 1.43. Simulating a dynamic general-equilibrium model yields ...
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作者:Matthewes, Soenke Hendrik
作者单位:Free University of Berlin; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
摘要:I study the effects of early between-school ability tracking on student achievement. My research design exploits institutional differences between German federal states: in all states about 40% of students transition to separate academic-track schools after comprehensive primary school. Depending on the state, the remaining student body is either directly tracked between two additional school types or taught comprehensively for another two years. Comparing these students before and after track...
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作者:Black, Sandra E.; Breining, Sanni; Figlio, David N.; Guryan, Jonathan; Karbownik, Krzysztof; Nielsen, Helena Skyt; Roth, Jeffrey; Simonsen, Marianne
作者单位:Columbia University; Aarhus University; Northwestern University; Emory University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要:It is notoriously difficult to identify peer effects within the family. Using administrative data on children from both Florida and Denmark, the paper examines the effects of having a disabled younger sibling. To address the identification challenge, the paper compares the differential effects for first- and second-born children in three-plus-child families, taking advantage of the fact that birth order influences the amount of time that a child spends in early childhood with their younger sib...
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作者:Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni; Chand, A. K. S.
作者单位:University of Leicester; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要:We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed experts, receiving coarse signals about a uniform state of the world. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium. However, with multiple experts the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthful...