STRATEGIC TRANSMISSION OF CORRELATED INFORMATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni; Chand, A. K. S.
• 署名单位: University of Leicester; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa039
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2175-2206
• 关键词: Herd behavior; asymmetric information; multiple referrals; selective exposure; legislative rules; aggregation; INVESTMENT; defaults; internet; news

摘要

We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed experts, receiving coarse signals about a uniform state of the world. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium. However, with multiple experts the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully can be non-monotonic: while little and large levels of correlation hinder truth-telling, intermediate levels may discipline experts' equilibrium behaviour and foster truthful communication. We discuss the implications of our results for the political discussion in the presence of 'selective exposure' to media, where similarity in preferences comes with higher correlation, and a trade-off between truth-telling incentives and informational content arises.