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作者:Banerjee, Abhijit V.; Duflo, Esther
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:This article uses variation in access to a targeted lending program to estimate whether firms are credit constrained. While both constrained and unconstrained firms may be willing to absorb all the directed credit that they can get (because it may be cheaper than other sources of credit), constrained firms will use it to expand production, while unconstrained firms will primarily use it as a substitute for other borrowing. We apply these observations to firms in India that became eligible for ...
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作者:Giuliano, Paola; Spilimbergo, Antonio
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; International Monetary Fund
摘要:Does the historical macroeconomic environment affect preferences for redistribution? We find that individuals who experienced a recession when young believe that success in life depends more on luck than effort, support more government redistribution, and tend to vote for left-wing parties. The effect of recessions on beliefs is long-lasting. We support our findings with evidence from three different datasets. First, we identify the effect of recessions on beliefs exploiting time and regional ...
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作者:Stinebrickner, Ralph; Stinebrickner, Todd R.
作者单位:Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要:Taking advantage of unique longitudinal data, we provide the first characterization of what college students believe at the time of entrance about their final major, relate these beliefs to actual major outcomes, and provide an understanding of why students hold the initial beliefs about majors that they do. The data collection and analysis are based directly on a conceptual model in which a student's final major is best viewed as the end result of a learning process. We find that students ent...
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作者:Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.; Wang, Stephanie W.; Camerer, Colin F.
作者单位:University of Southern California; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; California Institute of Technology
摘要:To understand the thinking process in private information games, we use Mousetracking to record which payoffs subjects attend to. The games have three information states and vary in strategic complexity. Subjects consistently deviate from Nash equilibrium choices and often fail to look at payoffs which they need to in order to compute an equilibrium response. Choices and lookups are similar when stakes are higher. When cluster analysis is used to group subjects according to lookup patterns and...
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作者:Kramarz, Francis; Skans, Oskar Nordstrom
作者单位:Uppsala University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要:The conditions under which young workers find their first real post-graduation jobs are important for their future careers and insufficiently documented given their potential importance for young workers welfare. To study these conditions, and in particular the role played by social ties, we use a Swedish population-wide linked employer-employee data set of graduates from all levels of schooling that includes detailed information on family ties, neighbourhoods, schools, class composition, and ...
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作者:Alonso, Ricardo; Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位:University of Southern California; University of Southern California; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要:When an individual performs several tasks simultaneously, processing resources must be allocated to different brain systems to produce energy for neurons to fire. Following the evidence from neuroscience, we model the brain as an organization in which a coordinator allocates limited resources to the brain systems responsible for the different tasks. Systems are privately informed about the amount of resources necessary to perform their task and compete to obtain the resources. The coordinator ...
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作者:Duranton, Gilles; Morrow, Peter M.; Turner, Matthew A.
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; University of Toronto
摘要:We estimate the effect of interstate highways on the level and composition of trade for US cities. Highways within cities have a large effect on the weight of city exports with an elasticity of approximately 0.5. We find little effect of highways on the total value of exports. Consistent with this, we find that cities with more highways specialize in sectors producing heavy goods.
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作者:Fleurbaey, Marc; Tadenuma, Koichi
作者单位:Princeton University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要:We introduce the concept of a universal social ordering, defined on the set of pairs of an allocation and a preference profile of any finite population. It is meant to unify evaluations and comparisons of welfare (living standards) for individuals and populations of possibly different sizes and preferences. It can be used for policy evaluation, international comparisons, growth assessment, and inequality measurement. It even makes it possible to evaluate policy options that affect the size of ...
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作者:Fitzgerald, Doireann; Haller, Stefanie
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University College Dublin
摘要:We use micro data on Irish producer prices to provide clean evidence on pricing-to-market across a broad range of manufacturing sectors. We have monthly observations on prices charged by the same plant for the same product to buyers in Ireland and the UK, two markets segmented by variable exchange rates. Assuming that relative marginal cost is constant across markets within a plant and a product, this allows us to observe the behaviour of the markup in the UK market relative to the home market...
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作者:Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania
摘要:We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and/or the monitoring structure. Each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned. We show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain ...