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作者：Hackbarth, Dirk; Johnson, Timothy
作者单位：Boston University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We examine the asset pricing implications of a neoclassical model of repeated investment and disinvestment. Prior research has emphasized a negative relation between productivity and equity risk that results from operating leverage when capital adjustment is costly. In general, however, expansion and contraction options affect risk in the opposite direction: they lower equity risk as profitability declines. The general prediction is a non-monotonic overlay of opposing real option and operating...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This article studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of...
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作者：Bruno, Valentina; Shin, Hyun Song
作者单位：American University; Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
摘要：We investigate global factors associated with bank capital flows. We formulate a model of the international banking system where global banks interact with local banks. The solution highlights the bank leverage cycle as the determinant of the transmission of financial conditions across borders through banking sector capital flows. A distinctive prediction of the model is that local currency appreciation is associated with higher leverage of the banking sector, thereby providing a conceptual br...
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Kasa, Kenneth
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Hanyang University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：This paper studies adaptive learning with multiple models. An agent operating in a self-referential environment is aware of potential model misspecification, and tries to detect it, in real-time, using an econometric specification test. If the current model passes the test, it is used to construct an optimal policy. If it fails the test, a new model is selected. As the rate of coefficient updating decreases, one model becomes dominant, and is used almost always. Dominant models can be characte...
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作者：Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This article analyses contractual situations between many principals and many agents. The agents have private information, and the principals take actions. Principals have the ability to contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts offered by other principals. Contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. The main result of the article is a characterization of the allocations that can be implemented as equilibria in our contracting game. We then r...
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作者：Bloom, Nicholas; Propper, Carol; Seiler, Stephan; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Imperial College London; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public hospital sector where entry and exit are controlled by the central government. Because closing hospitals in areas where the governing party is expecting a tight election race (marginals) is rare due to the fear of electoral defeat, we can use political marginality as an instrumental variable for the number of hospitals in a geo...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：We study the evolution of a social norm of cooperation in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behaviour that are stable in part due to agents' interpretations of private information about the past, influenced by occasional commonly observed past behaviours. For sufficiently backward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leadin...
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作者：Rhodes, Andrew
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it attracts consumers who are more price sensitive. Similarly, when a firm advertises a low price on one product, consumers rationally expect it to charge somewhat lower prices on its other products as we...
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作者：Bordon, Paola; Fu, Chao
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Many countries use college-major-specific admissions policies that require a student to choose a college-major pair jointly. Given the potential of student-major mismatches, we explore the equilibrium effects of postponing student choice of major. We develop a sorting equilibrium model under the college-major-specific admissions regime, allowing for match uncertainty and peer effects. We estimate the model using Chilean data. We introduce the counterfactual regime as a Stackelberg game in whic...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：When is it best for the Principal to commit to not disclosing all that he/she knows in moral hazard interactions? I show that whenever the Agent would choose the same action under complete information at several distinct states, then full transparency can generically be improved upon. This implies that full transparency is generically suboptimal whenever the dimension of the information held by the Principal exceeds the dimension of the Agent's action. In a simple class of problems, I make fur...
