On Transparency in Organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdu040
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 736-761
• 关键词: optimal information disclosure; moral hazard; auctions

摘要

When is it best for the Principal to commit to not disclosing all that he/she knows in moral hazard interactions? I show that whenever the Agent would choose the same action under complete information at several distinct states, then full transparency can generically be improved upon. This implies that full transparency is generically suboptimal whenever the dimension of the information held by the Principal exceeds the dimension of the Agent's action. In a simple class of problems, I make further progress on the best disclosure policy assuming the Principal can either disclose fully the state or remain silent.