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作者：Carroll, Gabriel; Segal, Ilya
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The standard revenue-maximizing auction discriminates against a priori stronger bidders so as to reduce their information rents. We show that such discrimination is no longer optimal when the auction's winner may resell to another bidder, and the auctioneer has non-Bayesian uncertainty about such resale opportunities. We identify a worst-case resale scenario, in which bidders' values become publicly known after the auction and losing bidders compete Bertrand-style to buy the object from the wi...
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作者：Schmutz, Benoit; Sidibe, Modibo
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Duke University
摘要：We build a dynamic model of migration where, in addition to standard relocation costs, workers face spatial frictions that decrease their ability to compete for distant job opportunities. We estimate the model on a matched employer-employee panel dataset describing labour market transitions within and between the 100 largest French cities. Our identification strategy is based on the premise that frictions affect the frequency of job transitions, while mobility costs impact the distribution of ...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; Thomas, Caroline
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching, when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time. To incentivize trustworthiness, defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion. However, it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation. With perfect bounded information, defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained, in any purifiable equilibrium. A coarse information structure, that pools recen...
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作者：Michaillat, Pascal; Saez, Emmanuel
作者单位：Brown University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This article proposes a theory of optimal public expenditure when unemployment is inefficient. The theory is based on a matching model. Optimal public expenditure deviates from the Samuelson rule to reduce the unemployment gap (the difference between current and efficient unemployment rates). Such optimal stimulus spending is described by a formula expressed with three sufficient statistics: the unemployment gap, the unemployment multiplier (the decrease in unemployment achieved by increasing ...
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作者：Amiti, Mary; Itskhoki, Oleg; Konings, Jozef
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Princeton University; University of Liverpool; KU Leuven
摘要：How strong are strategic complementarities in price setting across firms? In this article, we provide a direct empirical estimate of firms' price responses to changes in competitor prices. We develop a general theoretical framework and an empirical identification strategy, taking advantage of a new micro-level dataset for the Belgian manufacturing sector. We find strong evidence of strategic complementarities, with a typical firm adjusting its price with an elasticity of 0.4 in response to its...
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作者：Miller, Amalia R.; Segal, Carmit
作者单位：University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Zurich
摘要：We study the impact of the integration of women in U.S. policing between the late 1970s and early 1990s on violent crime reporting and domestic violence (DV). Along these two key dimensions, we find that female officers improved police quality. Crime victimization data reveal that as female representation increases among officers in an area, violent crimes against women in that area, and especially DV, are reported to the police at significantly higher rates. There are no such effects for viol...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Halevy, Yoram
作者单位：Boston University; University of Toronto
摘要：Many decisions are made in environments where outcomes are determined by the realization of multiple random events. A decision maker may be uncertain how these events are related. We identify and experimentally substantiate behaviour that intuitively reflects a lack of confidence in their joint distribution. Our findings suggest a dimension of ambiguity which is different from that in the classical distinction between risk and Knightian uncertainty.
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作者：Jullien, Bruno; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Northwestern University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We study platform markets in which the information about users' preferences is dispersed. First, we show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation decisions and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and the equilibrium prices. We then study the effects on profits, consumer surplus, and welfare of platform design, blogs, forums, conferences, advertising campaigns, post-launch disclosures, and other information management policies af...
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作者：Malenko, Andrey
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I study optimal design of a dynamic capital allocation process in an organization in which the division manager with empire-building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects, and headquarters can audit projects at a cost. Under certain conditions, a budgeting mechanism with threshold separation of financing is optimal. Headquarters: (1) allocate a spending account to the manager and replenish it over time; (2) set a threshold, such that projects below it...
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作者：Cole, Harold L.; Kim, Soojin; Krueger, Dirk
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Tilburg University
摘要：This article quantitatively evaluates the trade-off between the provision of health-related social insurance and the incentives to maintain good health through costly investments. To do so, we construct and estimate a dynamic model of health investments and health insurance in which the cross-sectional health distribution evolves endogenously and is shaped by labour market and health insurance policies. A no wage discrimination law in the labour market limits the extent to which wages can depe...
