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作者:Gomes, Renato; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位:Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Northwestern University
摘要:We develop a framework to study optimal sector-specific taxation, where each agent chooses an occupation by comparing her skill differential with the tax burden differential across sectors. Because skills are not perfectly transferable, the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem (according to which the second-best entails production efficiency) fails: social welfare can be increased by inducing some agents to join the sector in which their productivity is not the highest. At the optimum, income taxes balanc...
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作者:Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz; Smith, Lones; Bognar, Katalin
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要:We explore costly deliberation by two differentially informed and possibly biased jurors: A hawk Lones and a dove Moritz alternately insist on a verdict until one concedes. Debate assumes one of two genres, depending on bias: Ajuror, say Lones, is intransigent if he wishes to prevail and reach a conviction for any type of Moritz next to concede. In contrast, Lones is ambivalent if he wants the strongest conceding types of Moritz to push for acquittal. Both jurors are ambivalent with small bias...
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作者:Gaballo, Gaetano
作者单位:European Central Bank; Bank of France
摘要:This article shows that when agents learn from prices, large private uncertainty may result from a small amount of heterogeneity. As in a Phelps-Lucas island model, final producers look at the prices of their local inputs to infer aggregate conditions. However, market linkages between islands make the informativeness of local prices endogenous to general equilibrium relations. In this context, I show that a vanishingly small heterogeneity in local conditions is enough to generate an equilibriu...
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作者:Chang, Briana
作者单位:University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要:This article develops a tractable model with two-dimensional asymmetric information in asset markets: sellers are privately informed about their asset quality and distress positions. Illiquidity arises endogenously and manifests itself through two distinct market outcomes. The first outcome features limited market participation, resulting in a dry-up in trading volume. The second outcome involves a large volume at a depressed price. Only in the latter outcome do distressed sellers engage in fi...
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作者:In, Younghwan; Wright, Julian
作者单位:National University of Singapore
摘要:For many applications of signalling, senders rather than nature choose unobserved features such as their private choices of quality, capacity, investment, contract, or price, along with other actions that are (partially) observed by receivers. Despite the large number of different applications, these games have not been studied in any systematic way. We identify and study a general class of such games, which we call endogenous signalling games. These games normally suffer from a plethora of eq...
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作者:Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik
作者单位:Bar Ilan University; Lund University
摘要:We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types. The presence of committed agents destabilizes previously proposed mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in various envir...
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作者:Caliendo, Lorenzo; Parro, Fernando; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban; Sarte, Pierre-Daniel
作者单位:Yale University; Johns Hopkins University; Princeton University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要:We study the impact of intersectoral and interregional trade linkages in propagating disaggregated productivity changes to the rest of the economy. Using U.S. regional and industry data, we obtain the aggregate, regional and sectoral elasticities of measured total factor productivity, GDP, and employment to regional and sectoral productivity changes. We find that the elasticities vary significantly depending on the sectors and regions affected, and are importantly determined by the spatial str...
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作者:Cunningham, Scott; Shah, Manisha
作者单位:Baylor University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:Most governments in the world, including the U.S., prohibit sex work. Given these types of laws rarely change and are fairly uniform across regions, our knowledge about the impact of decriminalizing sex work is largely conjectural. We exploit the fact that a Rhode Island District Court judge unexpectedly decriminalized indoor sex work to provide causal estimates of the impact of decriminalization on the composition of the sex market, reported rape offences, and sexually transmitted infections....
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作者:Bianchi, Francesco; Ilut, Cosmin L.; Schneider, Martin
作者单位:Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Stanford University
摘要:This article estimates a business cycle model with endogenous financial asset supply and ambiguity averse investors. Firms' shareholders choose not only production and investment, but also capital structure and payout policy subject to financial frictions. An increase in uncertainty about profits lowers stock prices and leads firms to substitute away from debt as well as reduce shareholder payout. This mechanism parsimoniously accounts for the postwar comovement in investment, stock prices, le...
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作者:Lauermann, Stephan; Merzyn, Wolfram; Virag, Gabor
作者单位:University of Bonn; University of Toronto
摘要:We introduce learning into an otherwise standard two-sided search-and-bargaining market. There is uncertainty about the price distribution due to uncertainty about an underlying exogenous state of relative demand: in the high state, buyers are on the long side; otherwise, they are on the short side. In equilibrium, prices are on average higher in the high state. Individual agents learn about the distribution while searching. Agents typically start out by experimenting with a tough bargaining p...