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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.; Georgiadis, George; Khorasani, Sina; Rayo, Luis
作者单位：Northwestern University; University System of Ohio; University of Dayton
摘要：We obtain optimal dynamic contests for environments where the designer monitors effort through coarse, binary signals-Poisson successes-and aims to elicit maximum effort, ideally in the least amount of time possible, given a fixed prize. The designer has a vast set of contests to choose from, featuring termination and prize-allocation rules together with real-time feedback for the contestants. Every effort-maximizing contest (which also maximizes total expected successes) has a history-depende...
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作者：Garrett, Daniel; Ordin, Andrey; Roberts, James W.; Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the interaction between tax advantages for municipal bonds and the market structure of auctions for these bonds. We show that this interaction can limit a bidder's ability to extract information rents and is a crucial determinant of state and local governments' borrowing costs. Reduced-form estimates show that increasing the tax advantage by 3 pp lowers mean borrowing costs by 9-10%. We estimate a structural auction model to measure markups and to illustrate and quantify how the inter...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; Lee, SangMok; Rappoport, Daniel
作者单位：Columbia University; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Chicago
摘要：An agent's preferences depend on an ordered parameter or type. We characterize the set of utility functions with single-crossing differences (SCD) in convex environments. These include preferences over lotteries, both in expected utility and rank-dependent utility frameworks, and preferences over bundles of goods and over consumption streams. Our notion of SCD does not presume an order on the choice space. This unordered SCD is necessary and sufficient for interval choice comparative statics. ...
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作者：Fitzgerald, Doireann; Haller, Stefanie; Yedid-Levi, Yaniv
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University College Dublin; Reichman University
摘要：We use customs data for Irish firms to show that in successful episodes of export market entry, there are statistically and economically significant post-entry dynamics of quantities, but not of mark-ups. To match these moments, we structurally estimate a model where firms can invest in future customer base through two channels: by selling more today, and by spending on marketing and advertising. Our estimates suggest that customer base is insensitive to lagged sales, so firms have no incentiv...
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作者：Ozdenoren, Emre; Yuan, Kathy; Zhang, Shengxing
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Peking University; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen)
摘要：Borrowers obtain liquidity by issuing securities backed by the current period payoff and resale price of a long-lived collateral asset, and they are privately informed about the payoff distribution. Asset price can be self-fulfilling: a higher asset price lowers adverse selection and allows borrowers to raise greater funding, which makes the asset more valuable, leading to multiple equilibria. Optimal security design eliminates multiple equilibria, improves welfare, and can be implemented as a...
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作者：Nagy, Davidkrisztian
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI)
摘要：I study how geography shaped city formation and aggregate development in the U.S. prior to the Civil War. To guide my analysis, I present a conjecture that cities' farm hinterlands fostered both city development and aggregate growth: the hinterland hypothesis. The hinterland hypothesis has rich implications on how various elements of U.S. geography-railroads, changes in U.S. political borders, and international trade-affected city formation and U.S. growth. To evaluate the hinterland hypothesi...
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作者：Collado, M. Dolores; Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio; Stuhler, Jan
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We quantify intergenerational and assortative processes by comparing different degrees of kinship within the same generation. This horizontal approach yields more, and more distant kinship moments than traditional methods, which allows us to account for the transmission of latent advantages in a detailed intergenerational model. Using Swedish registers, we find strong persistence in the latent determinants of status, and a striking degree of sorting-to explain the similarity of distant kins, a...
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作者：Jager, Simon; Schoefer, Benjamin; Zweimuller, Josef
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Zurich
摘要：We present a test of Coasean theories of efficient separations. We study a cohort of jobs from the introduction through the repeal of a large age- and region-specific unemployment benefit extension in Austria. In the treatment group, 18.5% fewer jobs survive the program period. According to the Coasean view, the destroyed marginal jobs had low joint surplus. Hence, after the repeal, the treatment survivors should be more resilient than the ineligible control group survivors. Strikingly, the tw...
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作者：Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun; Ortner, Juan; Chassang, Sylvain
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Kindai University (Kinki University); Boston University; Princeton University
摘要：Cartels participating in procurement auctions frequently use bid rotation or prioritize incumbents to allocate contracts. However, establishing a link between observed allocation patterns and firm conduct has been difficult: there are cost-based competitive explanations for such patterns. We show that by focusing on auctions in which the winning and losing bids are very close, it is possible to distinguish allocation patterns reflecting cost differences across firms from patterns reflecting no...
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作者：Deb, Rahul; Roesler, Anne-Katrin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type vector is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known prior distribution. The seller chooses a mechanism to maximize her worst-case profits against all possible signals from which the buyer can learn about his values for the goods. We show that it is robustly optimal for the seller to bundle goods with identical demands (these are goods that can be permuted without changing the buyer's prior type distribution). Cons...
