Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun; Ortner, Juan; Chassang, Sylvain
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Kindai University (Kinki University); Boston University; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac013
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 376-403
• 关键词: procurement; auctions

摘要

Cartels participating in procurement auctions frequently use bid rotation or prioritize incumbents to allocate contracts. However, establishing a link between observed allocation patterns and firm conduct has been difficult: there are cost-based competitive explanations for such patterns. We show that by focusing on auctions in which the winning and losing bids are very close, it is possible to distinguish allocation patterns reflecting cost differences across firms from patterns reflecting non-competitive environments. We apply our tests to two datasets: the sample of Ohio milk auctions studied in Porter and Zona (1999, Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding, RAND Journal of Economics, 30, 263-288), and a sample of municipal procurement auctions from Japan.