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作者：Burchardi, Konrad B.; Hassan, Tarek A.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to show that personal relationships which individuals maintain for noneconomic reasons can be an important determinant of regional economic growth. We show that West German households who had social ties to East Germany in 1989 experienced a persistent rise in their personal incomes after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, the presence of these households significantly affects economic performance at the regional level: it increases the returns to...
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作者：Davis, Steven J.; Faberman, R. Jason; Haltiwanger, John C.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This paper is the first to study vacancies, hires, and vacancy yields at the establishment level in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, a large sample of US employers. To interpret the data, we develop a simple model that identifies the flow of new vacancies and the job-filling rate for vacant positions. The fill rate moves counter to aggregate employment but rises steeply with employer growth rates in the cross section. It falls with employer size, rises with worker turnover rates, an...
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作者：Kroft, Kory; Lange, Fabian; Notowidigdo, Matthew J.
作者单位：University of Toronto; McGill University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article studies the role of employer behavior in generating negative duration dependence-the adverse effect of a longer unemployment spell-by sending fictitious resumes to real job postings in 100 U.S. cities. Our results indicate that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview significantly decreases with the length of a worker's unemployment spell, with the majority of this decline occurring during the first eight months. We explore how this effect varies with local labor m...
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作者：Kleven, Henrik J.; Waseem, Mazhar
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We develop a framework for nonparametrically identifying optimization frictions and structural elasticities using notches-discontinuities in the choice sets of agents-introduced by tax and transfer policies. Notches create excess bunching on the low-tax side and missing mass on the high-tax side of a cutoff, and they are often associated with a region of strictly dominated choice that would have zero mass in a frictionless world. By combining excess bunching (observed response attenuated by fr...
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作者：Harris, Christopher; Laibson, David
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Extending Barro (1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003), we introduce a new model of time preferences: the instantaneous-gratification model. This model applies tractably to a much wider range of settings than existing models. It applies to both complete- and incomplete-market settings and it works with generic utility functions. It works in settings with linear policy rules and in settings in which equilibrium cannot be supported by linear rules. The instantaneous-gratification model also gene...
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作者：Ludema, Rodney D.; Mayda, Anna Maria
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：International trade agreements are an important element of the world economic system, but questions remain as to their purpose. The terms-of-trade hypothesis posits that countries use tariffs in part to improve their terms of trade and that trade agreements cause them to internalize the costs that such terms-of-trade shifts impose on other countries. This article investigates whether the most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs set by World Trade Organization (WTO) members in the Uruguay Round are co...
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作者：Powell, Robert
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Governments in weak states often face an armed opposition and have to decide whether to try to accommodate and contain that adversary or to try to consolidate power and monopolize violence by disarming it. When and why do governments choose to consolidate power and monopolize violence? How fast do they try to consolidate power? When does this lead to costly fighting rather than to efforts to eliminate the opposition by buying it off? We study an infinite-horizon model in which the government i...
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作者：Lyn, Gary; Rodriguez-Clare, Andres
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Lowell; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Recently, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (GRH; External Economies and International Trade: Redux, Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 [2010], 829-858) proposed a novel way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the industry level. Instead of perfect competition and two industries, GRH assume Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. GRH conclude that the equilibrium is unique if transport costs are low, that t...
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作者：Alesina, Alberto; Giuliano, Paola; Nunn, Nathan
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：The study examines the historical origins of existing cross-cultural differences in beliefs and values regarding the appropriate role of women in society. We test the hypothesis that traditional agricultural practices influenced the historical gender division of labor and the evolution of gender norms. We find that, consistent with existing hypotheses, the descendants of societies that traditionally practiced plough agriculture today have less equal gender norms, measured using reported gender...
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作者：Legros, Patrick; Newman, Andrew F.
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Boston University
摘要：This article presents a perfectly competitive model of firm boundary decisions and study their interplay with product demand, technology, and welfare. Integration is privately costly but is effective at coordinating production decisions; nonintegration is less costly but coordinates relatively poorly. Output price influences the choice of ownership structure: integration increases with the price level. At the same time, ownership affects output, because integration is more productive than noni...
