Journal of Political Economy

最新文章

• A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis AI翻译
  作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Lamy, Laurent
  作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London; AgroParisTech
  摘要：We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located, and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens. It is shown in quasi-linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare. Interpretations and limitations of the result ar...
• Assignment Problems AI翻译
  作者：Reny, Philip J.
  作者单位：University of Chicago
• Time-Series Econometrics in Macroeconomics and Finance AI翻译
  作者：Hansen, Lars Peter
  作者单位：University of Chicago
• The Power of Abortion Policy: Reexamining the Effects of Young Women's Access to Reproductive Control AI翻译
  作者：Myers, Caitlin Knowles
  作者单位：Middlebury College; IZA Institute Labor Economics
  摘要：I provide new evidence on the relative powers of contraception and abortion policy in effecting the dramatic social transformations of the. 1960s and 1970s. Trends in sexual behavior suggest that young worn en's increased access to the birth control pill fueled the sexual revolution, but neither these trends nor difference -in -difference estimates support the view that this also led to substantial changes in family formation. Rather, the estimates robustly suggest that it was liberalized acce...
• Business Cycles and International Trade AI翻译
  作者：Uhlig, Harald
  作者单位：University of Chicago
• Contests for Experimentation AI翻译
  作者：Halac, Marina; Kartik, Navin; Liu, Qingmin
  作者单位：Columbia University; University of Warwick
  摘要：We study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation's feasibility and opponents' outcomes. We characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize-sharing scheme and a disclosure policy. A public winner-takes-all contest dominates public contestswhere any success is immediately disclosedwith any other prize-sharing scheme as well as winner-takes-all contests with any other disclosure policy. Yet, jointly modifying prize sharing and disclosure can inc...
• Life Cycle Wage Dyamics and Labor Mobility AI翻译
  作者：Neal, Derek
  作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• The Design of Debt-Clearing Markets: Clearinghouse Mechanisms in Preindustrial Europe AI翻译
  作者：Borner, Lars; Hatfield, John William
  作者单位：University of London; King's College London; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
  摘要：We examine the evolution of the decentralized clearinghouse mechanisms that were in use throughout Europe from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century; in particular, we explore the clearing of nontradable or limited -tradable debts such as bills of exchange. We construct a theoretical model of these clearinghouse mechanisms and show that the specific decentralized multilateral clearing algorithms known as rescontre, skontrieren, or virement des parties, used by merchants in this peri...
• The Economics of Crime AI翻译
  作者：Levitt, Steven D.
  作者单位：University of Chicago
• The Continuing Impact of Sherwin Rosen's Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition AI翻译
  作者：Greenstone, Michael
  作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research