A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe; Lamy, Laurent
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London; AgroParisTech
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/696273
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 735-760
• 关键词: schools benefit students; pure theory; efficient; auctions; COMPETITION; incentives; clubs; Jurisdictions; equilibrium; extraction

摘要

We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located, and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens. It is shown in quasi-linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare. Interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed.