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作者：Kawai, Kei; Onishi, Ken; Uetake, Kosuke
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Yale University
摘要：We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in an online credit market, using detailed data on loan characteristics and borrower repayment. We build and estimate an equilibrium model in which a borrower may signal her default risk through the reserve interest rate. Comparing markets with and without signaling relative to the benchmark with no asymmetric information, we find that adverse selection destroys as much as 34% of total surplus, up to 78% of which can be restored w...
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作者：Ravid, Doron; Roesler, Anne-Katrin; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model in which the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she can privately purchase any signal about her valuation. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. The cost of a signal is smooth and increasing in informativeness. We characterize the set of equilibria when learning is free and show that they are strongly Pareto ranked. Our main result is that when learning is costly but the cost of information goes to zero, equilibria...
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作者：Broccardo, Eleonora; Hart, Oliver; Zingales, Luigi
作者单位：University of Trento; Harvard University; University of Chicago
摘要：We study the relative effectiveness of exit (divestment and boycott) and voice (engagement) strategies in a world where companies generate externalities and some agents care about the social impact of their decisions. We show that if the majority of investors are even slightly socially responsible, voice achieves the socially optimal outcome. In contrast, exit does not unless everybody is significantly socially responsible. If the majority of investors are purely selfish, exit is a more effect...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Ordin, Andrey; Roberts, James W.
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Auctions are often used to sell assets whose future cash flows require the winner to make postauction investments. When winners' payments are contingent on these cash flows, auction design can influence both bidding and incentives to exert effort after the auction. We propose a model of contingent payment auctions that links auction design to postauction economic activity. In the context of oil leases in the Permian Basin, we show that moral hazard affects the relative revenue ranking of diffe...
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作者：Lechene, Valerie; Pendakur, Krishna; Wolf, Alex
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Simon Fraser University
摘要：We provide a method to estimate resource shares-the fraction of total household expenditure allocated to each household member-using linear (e.g., ordinary least squares) estimation of Engel curves. The method is a linear reframing of the 2013 nonlinear model of Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur, extended to allow single-parent and other complex households, scale economies in assignable goods, and complementarities between nonassignable goods and supplemented with a linear identification test. We a...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Zhang, Xu
作者单位：Brown University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (Guangzhou); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Following Kamenica and Gentzkow, this paper studies persuasion as an information design problem. We investigate how mistakes in probabilistic inference impact optimal persuasion. The concavification method is shown to extend naturally to a large class of belief updating rules, which we identify and characterize. This class comprises many non-Bayesian models discussed in the literature. We apply this new technique to gain insight into the revelation principle, the ranking of updating rules, whe...
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作者：Aguiar, Mark; Chatterjee, Satyajit; Cole, Harold; Stangebye, Zachary
作者单位：Princeton University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania; University of Notre Dame
摘要：Lack of commitment at the time of auction to repayment of imminently maturing debt can generate a run on debt and immediate default. We show that the same lack of commitment leads to other possible self-fulfilling crises, including issuance of more debt at depressed prices, or a sudden stop (forced austerity) in which debt issuance is sharply curtailed. Both outcomes stem from the government's incentive to eliminate uncertainty about imminent payments at the time of auction by altering the lev...
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作者：Dewitte, Ruben
作者单位：Ghent University
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作者：Foerster, Andrew T.; Hornstein, Andreas; Sarte, Pierre-Daniel G.; Watson, Mark W.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We describe how capital accumulation and the network structure of US production interact to amplify the effects of sectoral trend growth rates in total factor productivity and labor on trend GDP (gross domestic product) growth. We derive expressions that conveniently summarize this long-run amplification effect by way of sectoral multipliers. We estimate that sector-specific factors have historically accounted for approximately three-fourths of long-run changes in GDP growth. Trend GDP growth ...
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作者：Fehr, Dietmar; Fink, Gunther; Jack, B. Kelsey
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Basel; Swiss Tropical & Public Health Institute; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We investigate the link between poverty and decision-making in a sample of farmers in Zambia, who were given the opportunity to exchange randomly assigned household items for alternative items of similar value. Analyzing a total of 5,842 trading decisions and leveraging multiple sources of variation in financial constraints, we show that exchange asymmetries decrease in magnitude when participants are more constrained. This result is robust to experimental procedures and is not mediated by cha...
