Signaling in Online Credit Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kawai, Kei; Onishi, Ken; Uetake, Kosuke
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/718984
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1585-1629
• 关键词: information; MODEL

摘要

We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in an online credit market, using detailed data on loan characteristics and borrower repayment. We build and estimate an equilibrium model in which a borrower may signal her default risk through the reserve interest rate. Comparing markets with and without signaling relative to the benchmark with no asymmetric information, we find that adverse selection destroys as much as 34% of total surplus, up to 78% of which can be restored with signaling. We also estimate backward-bending supply curves for some markets, consistent with the prediction made by Stiglitz and Weiss in 1981.