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作者：Ostrovsky, Michael; Schwarz, Michael
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Microsoft
摘要：We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, revenues increased substantially after the new reserve prices were introduced.
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作者：Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Oxford
摘要：Edgeworth's paradox of taxation occurs when an increase in the unit cost of a product causes a multiproduct monopolist to reduce prices. We give simple illustrations of the paradox and a general analysis of the case of linear marginal cost and demand conditions, and we characterize which matrices of cost pass-through terms are consistent with profit maximization. When the firm supplies at least one pair of substitute products, we show how Edgeworth's paradox always occurs with a suitable choic...
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作者：Farrokhi, Farid; Pellegrina, Heitor S. S.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：We examine the contribution of trade to the rise of modern agriculture, taking into account interactions between trade, input requirements, and technology adoption. We develop and estimate a new multicountry general equilibrium model that incorporates producers' choices of which crops to produce and with which technologies at the level of grid cells covering the earth's surface. We find that trade cost reductions in agricultural inputs and the international transmission of productivity growth ...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Kyungmin; Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：Columbia University; Emory University; University of London; University College London
摘要：We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow's sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in be...
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作者：Bocola, Luigi; Lorenzoni, Guido
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Financial crises typically occur because firms and financial institutions are highly exposed to aggregate shocks. We propose a theory to explain these exposures. We study a model where entrepreneurs can issue state-contingent claims to consumers. Even though entrepreneurs can use these instruments to hedge negative shocks, they do not necessarily do so because insuring against these shocks is expensive, as consumers are also harmed by them. This effect is self-reinforcing because riskier balan...
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作者：Dube, Jean-Pierre; Misra, Sanjog
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：We study the welfare implications of personalized pricing implemented with machine learning. We use data from a randomized controlled pricing field experiment to construct personalized prices and validate these in the field. We find that unexercised market power increases profit by 55%. Personalization improves expected profits by an additional 19% and by 86% relative to the nonoptimized price. While total consumer surplus declines under personalized pricing, over 60% of consumers benefit from...
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作者：Allen, Jason; Wittwer, Milena
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Boston College
摘要：In traditional over-the-counter markets, investors trade bilaterally through intermediaries. We assess whether and how to shift trades on a centralized platform with trade-level data on the Canadian government bond market. We document that intermediaries charge a markup when trading with investors and specify a model to quantify price and welfare effects from market centralization. We find that many investors would not use the platform, even if they could, because it is costly, competition for...
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作者：Choi, Michael; Liang, Fan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Loyola Marymount University
摘要：We consider a dynamic monetary economy where agents gradually learn about the holding cost of a new asset and coordinate to adopt it as money or abandon it. We provide closed-form solutions for state-contingent asset prices and agents' adoption decision. The transactional benefits of using money are endogenous and can convexify or concavify the payoff structure. Thus, the arrival of new information can raise or reduce the asset's price, which is in sharp contrast to standard insights in experi...
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作者：Arseneau, David M.; Chugh, Sanjay K.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
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作者：Kelly, Morgan; Mokyr, Joel; Grada, Cormac
作者单位：University College Dublin; Northwestern University
摘要：Although there are many competing explanations for the Industrial Revolution, there has been no effort to evaluate them econometrically. This paper analyzes how the very different patterns of growth across the counties of England between the 1760s and 1830s can be explained by a wide range of potential variables. We find that industrialization occurred in areas that began with low wages but high mechanical skills, whereas other variables, such as literacy, banks, and proximity to coal, have li...
