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作者：Chiu, Jonathan; Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza; Jiang, Janet; Zhu, Yu
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Renmin University of China
摘要：This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of payments to study the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on intermediation of private banks. If banks have market power in the deposit market, a CBDC can enhance competition, raising the deposit rate, expanding intermediation, and increasing output. A calibration to the US economy suggests that a CBDC can raise bank lending by 1.57% and output by 0.19%. These crowding-in effects remain robust, albeit with smaller ma...
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作者：Tungodden, Jonas; Willen, Alexander
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Parents make important choices for their children in many areas of life, yet the empirical literature on this topic is scarce. We study parents' competitiveness choices for their children by combining two large-scale artifactual field experiments with high-quality longitudinal administrative data. We document three main sets of findings. First, parents choose more competition for their sons than daughters. Second, this gender difference can largely be explained by parents' beliefs about their ...
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作者：Dean, Mark; Neligh, Nathaniel
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
摘要：We use laboratory experiments to test models of rational inattention, in which people acquire information to maximize utility net of information costs. We show that subjects adjust their attention in response to changes in incentives, in line with the rational inattention model. However, our results are qualitatively inconsistent with information costs that are linear in Shannon entropy, as is often assumed in applied work. Our data are best fit by a generalization of the Shannon model, which ...
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作者：Angeletos, George-Marios; Collard, Fabrice; Dellas, Harris
作者单位：Northwestern University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Surrey; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：We study optimal policy in an economy where interest rates are low because public debt serves as collateral or buffer stock. Issuing more public debt raises welfare by easing the underlying friction but also reduces the private valuation of this service, raising interest rates. This trade-off shapes the optimal quantity of public debt in the long run, justifies a departure from tax smoothing in the short run, and calls for larger deficits during financial crises. Our analysis illustrates the p...
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作者：Bardhi, Arjada; Bobkova, Nina
作者单位：Duke University; Rice University
摘要：A policymaker selects a minipublic-a group of citizens from a demographically diverse citizenry with access to local evidence about the impact of a policy. Citizens face uncertainty about the policymaker's eventual policy bias, which is shown to discourage the most marginally informative minipublic citizens from discovering their evidence. We fully characterize the optimal minipublic composition. Relative to the most demographically representative minipublic, the optimal minipublic overreprese...
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作者：Geromichalos, Athanasios; Herrenbrueck, Lucas; Lee, Sukjoon
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Simon Fraser University; New York University; NYU Shanghai
摘要：Many economists assume that safer assets are more liquid, and some have practically used safe and liquid as synonyms. But these terms are not synonyms, and mixing them up can lead to confusion and wrong policy recommendations. We build a multiasset model where an asset's safety and liquidity are well defined and distinct, and we examine their relationship in general equilibrium. We show that the common belief that safety implies liquidity is generally justified but also identify conditions und...
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作者：Jones, Charles I.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：As Romer and Weitzman emphasized in the 1990s, new ideas are often combinations of existing ideas, an insight absent from recent models. In Kortum's research around the same time, ideas are draws from a probability distribution, and Pareto distributions play a crucial role. Why are combinations missing, and do we really need such strong distributional assumptions to get exponential growth? This paper demonstrates that combinatorially growing draws from standard thin-tailed distributions lead t...
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作者：Jun, Sung Jae; Lee, Sokbae
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Columbia University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper examines a commonly used measure of persuasion whose precise interpretation has been obscure in the literature. By using the potential outcome framework, we define the causal persuasion rate by a proper conditional probability of taking the action of interest with a persuasive message conditional on not taking the action without the message. We then formally study identification under empirically relevant data scenarios and show that the commonly adopted measure generally does not e...
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作者：Crouzet, Nicolas; Gupta, Apoorv; Mezzanotti, Filippo
作者单位：Northwestern University; Dartmouth College
摘要：We provide evidence on the importance of coordination frictions in technology adoption, using data from a large provider of electronic wallets during the Indian demonetization. Exploiting geographical variation in exposure to the demonetization, we show that adoption of the wallet increased persistently in response to the large but temporary cash contraction, consistent with the predictions of a technology adoption model with complementarities. Model estimates indicate that adoption would have...
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作者：Demarzo, Peter; He, Zhiguo; Tourre, Fabrice
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We study an impatient, risk-neutral government that cannot commit to a particular debt path, financed by competitive lenders. In equilibrium, debt adjusts slowly toward a debt-to-income target, exacerbating booms and busts. Strikingly, gains from trade dissipate when trading is continuous, leaving the government no better off than in financial autarky, owing to a sovereign debt ratchet effect. Moreover, citizens who are more patient than their government are strictly harmed. We characterize eq...
