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作者：Currie, Janet M.; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：Treatment for depression is complex, requiring decisions that may involve trade-offs between exploiting treatments with the highest expected value and experimenting with treatments with higher possible payoffs. Using patient claims data, we show that among skilled doctors, using a broader portfolio of drugs predicts better patient outcomes, except in cases where doctors' decisions violate loose professional guidelines. We introduce a behavioral model of decision making guided by our empirical ...
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作者：Attanasio, Orazio; Pastorino, Elena
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Stanford University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：This paper examines the prices of basic staples in rural Mexico. We document that nonlinear pricing in the form of quantity discounts is common, that quantity discounts are sizable for basic staples, and that the well-known conditional cash transfer program Progresa has significantly increased quantity discounts, although the program, as documented in previous studies, has not affected unit prices on average. To account for these patterns, we propose a model of price discrimination that nests ...
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作者：Chandrasekhar, Arun G.; Larreguy, Horacio; Xandri, Juan Pablo
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Princeton University
摘要：We theoretically and empirically study an incomplete information model of social learning. Agents initially guess the binary state of the world after observing a private signal. In subsequent rounds, agents observe their network neighbors' previous guesses before guessing again. Agents are drawn from a mixture of learning types-Bayesian, who face incomplete information about others' types, and DeGroot, who average their neighbors' previous period guesses and follow the majority. We study (1) l...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Mirrokni, Vahab; Paes Leme, Renato; Tang, Pingzhong; Zuo, Song
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Tsinghua University
摘要：We introduce a new family of dynamic mechanisms that restricts sellers from using future distributional knowledge. Since the allocation and pricing of each auction period do not depend on the type distributions of future periods, we call this family of dynamic mechanisms non-clairvoyant. We develop a framework (bank account mechanisms) for characterizing, designing, and proving lower bounds for dynamic mechanisms (clairvoyant or non-clairvoyant). We use the same methods to compare the revenue ...
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作者：Faingold, Eduardo
作者单位：Insper
摘要：Equilibrium payoff bounds from reputation effects are derived for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which a long-run player interacts frequently with a population of short-run players and the monitoring technology scales with the length of the period of interaction. The bounds depend on the monitoring technology through theflow of information, a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on relative entropy. Examples are shown where, under complete information, t...
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作者：Dardanoni, Valentino; Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco; Tyson, Christopher J.
作者单位：University of Palermo; University of Sussex; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：Theories of bounded rationality often assume a rich dataset of choices from many overlapping menus, limiting their practical applicability. In contrast, we study the problem of identifying the distribution of cognitive characteristics in a population of agents from a minimal dataset that consists of aggregate choice shares from a single menu, and includes no observable covariates of any kind. With homogeneous preferences, we find that consideration capacity and consideration probability distri...
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作者：Akbarpour, Mohammad; Li, Shengwu
作者单位：Stanford University; Harvard University
摘要：Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with bidders. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single bidder detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auc...
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作者：Costinot, Arnaud; Rodriguez-Clare, Andres; Werning, Ivan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The empirical observation that large firms tend to export, whereas small firms do not has transformed the way economists think about the determinants of international trade. Yet, it has had surprisingly little impact on how economists think about trade policy. Under very general conditions, we show that from the point of view of a country that unilaterally imposes trade taxes to maximize domestic welfare, the self-selection of heterogeneous firms into exports calls for import subsidies on the ...
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作者：Besley, Timothy
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper explores the role of civic culture in expanding fiscal capacity by developing a model based on reciprocal obligations: citizens pay their taxes and the state provides public goods. Civic culture evolves over time according to the relative payoff of civic-minded and materialist citizens. A strong civic culture manifests itself as high tax revenues sustained by high levels of voluntary tax compliance and provision of public goods. This captures the idea of government as a reciprocal s...
