CREDIBLE AUCTIONS: A TRILEMMA

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akbarpour, Mohammad; Li, Shengwu
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15925
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 425-467
• 关键词: imperfect commitment; revelation principle; mechanisms; DESIGN; games

摘要

Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with bidders. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single bidder detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism.