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作者：Bloise, Gaetano; Le Van, Cuong; Vailakis, Yiannis
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Paris School of Economics; IPAG Business School; University of Glasgow
摘要：We provide a unified approach to stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility based on an elementary application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. We establish that the exclusive source of multiple values is the presence of multiple recursive utilities consistent with the given aggregator, each yielding a legitimate value of the recursive program. We also present sufficient conditions ensuring a unique value of the recursive program in some circumstances. Overall, acknowledging the una...
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作者：Chiplunkar, Gaurav; Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou
作者单位：University of Virginia; Yale University
摘要：We develop a framework for quantifying barriers to labor force participation (LFP) and entrepreneurship faced by women in India. We find substantial barriers to LFP, and higher costs of expanding businesses through hiring workers for women entrepreneurs. However, there is one area where female entrepreneurs have an advantage: the hiring of female workers. We show that this is not driven by the sectoral composition of female employment. Consistent with this pattern, policies promoting female en...
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作者：Angeletos, George-Marios; Lian, Chen; Wolf, Christian K.
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Cambridge; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We ask how fiscal deficits are financed in environments with two key features: (i) nominal rigidity, and (ii) a violation of Ricardian equivalence due to finite lives or liquidity constraints. In such environments, deficits can contribute to their own financing through two channels: a boom in real economic activity, which expands the tax base; and a surge in inflation, which erodes the real value of nominal government debt. Our main theoretical result establishes that this mechanism becomes mo...
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作者：Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper develops a model of private bilateral contracting, in which an exogenous network determines the pairs of players who can communicate and contract with each other. After contracting, the players interact in an underlying game with globally verifiable productive actions and externally enforced transfers. The paper investigates whether such decentralized contracting can internalize externalities that arise due to parties being unable to contract directly with others whose productive ac...
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作者：Baqaee, David Rezza; Farhi, Emmanuel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Harvard University
摘要：We study a flexible class of trade models with international production networks and arbitrary wedge-like distortions like markups, tariffs, or nominal rigidities. We characterize the general equilibrium response of variables to shocks in terms of microeconomic statistics. Our results are useful for decomposing the sources of real GDP and welfare growth, and for computing counterfactuals. Using the same set of microeconomic sufficient statistics, we also characterize societal losses from incre...
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作者：Bardhi, Arjada
作者单位：New York University
摘要：An agent selectively samples attributes of a complex project so as to influence the decision of a principal. The players disagree about the weighting, or relevance, of attributes. The correlation across attributes is modeled through a Gaussian process, the covariance function of which captures pairwise attribute similarity. The key trade-off in sampling is between the alignment of the players' posterior values for the project and the variability of the principal's decision. Under a natural pro...
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作者：Dutting, Paul; Feldman, Michal; Peretz, Daniel; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Tel Aviv University; Yale University
摘要：We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an ambiguous contract, and this gain can be arbitrarily high. We characterize the structure of optimal ambiguous contracts, showing that ambiguity drives optimal contracts toward simplicity. We also provide a characterization of ambiguity-proof classes of contrac...
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作者：Bergeron, Augustin; Tourek, Gabriel; Weigel, Jonathan L.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper investigates how tax rates and tax enforcement jointly impact fiscal capacity in low-income countries. We study a policy experiment in the D.R. Congo that randomly assigned 38,028 property owners to the status quo tax rate or to a rate reduction. This variation in tax liabilities reveals that the status quo rate lies above the revenue-maximizing tax rate (RMTR). Reducing rates by about one-third would maximize government revenue by increasing tax compliance. We then exploit two sour...
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作者：Huang, Wanying; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Yale University
摘要：We study how long-lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state. Since equilibrium actions depend on higher-order beliefs, it is difficult to characterize behavior. Nevertheless, we show that regardless of the size and shape of the network, the utility function, and the patience of the agents, the speed of learning in any equ...
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作者：Guner, Nezih; Kaygusuz, Remzi; Ventura, Gustavo
作者单位：Durham University; Sabanci University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：The United States spends significant amounts on non-medical transfers for its working-age population in a wide range of programs that support low- and middle-income households. How valuable are these programs for U.S. households? Are there simpler, welfare-improving ways to transfer resources that are supported by a majority? What are the macroeconomic effects of such alternatives? We answer these questions in an equilibrium, life-cycle model with single and married households who face idiosyn...
