Ambiguous Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dutting, Paul; Feldman, Michal; Peretz, Daniel; Samuelson, Larry
• 署名单位: Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Tel Aviv University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22687
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1967-1992
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; moral hazard; randomization; DESIGN; RISK

摘要

We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an ambiguous contract, and this gain can be arbitrarily high. We characterize the structure of optimal ambiguous contracts, showing that ambiguity drives optimal contracts toward simplicity. We also provide a characterization of ambiguity-proof classes of contracts, where the principal cannot gain by infusing ambiguity. Finally, we show that when the agent can engage in mixed actions, the advantages of ambiguous contracts disappear.