Robustly collusion-proof implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Yonsei University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1063-1107
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; mechanism design; incomplete information; repeated auctions; DELEGATION; decentralization; externalities; monopolist; principal; 2nd-price

摘要

A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the second-best level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior. The collusion-proof implementation generalizes to a setting in which only a subset of agents may collude, provided that noncollusive agents' incentives can be protected via an ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism. Our collusion-proof implementation also sheds light on the extent to which hierarchical delegation of contracts can optimally respond to collusion.