-
作者:Yang, DT
作者单位:Duke University
-
作者:Weicher, JC
-
作者:Berk, JB
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
-
作者:Viscusi, WK; Hamilton, JT
作者单位:Harvard University; Duke University
-
作者:Lin, JYF; Tan, GF
作者单位:Peking University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of British Columbia
-
作者:Ravallion, M; Jalan, J
作者单位:The World Bank
-
作者:Mitra, D
作者单位:State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要:This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. Furthe...
-
作者:Altig, D; Carlstrom, CT
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要:In this paper we study the quantitative impact of marginal tax rates on the distribution of income. Our methodology builds on computable general-equilibrium framework. We find that distortions from marginal tax rate changes of the sort implied by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have sizable effects on income inequality in a reasonably quantified life-cycle setting: In our model rate changes alone capture half the increase in the pretax Gini that actually occurred between 1984 and 1989. (JEL C68, D3...
-
作者:Sen, A
作者单位:University of Cambridge
-
作者:Jones, CI
作者单位:Stanford University