Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: A long-run model of trade policy determination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mitra, D
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida International University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.5.1116
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 1116-1134
• 关键词: politics

摘要

This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. Furthermore, industries with higher levels of capital stock, fewer capitalists, more inelastic demand, and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized. (JEL F10, F13).