The American Economic Review

最新文章

• How Do You Measure a Technological Revolution? AI翻译
  作者：Corrado, Carol A.; Hulten, Charles R.
  作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
• Loan Syndication and Credit Cycles AI翻译
  作者：Ivashina, Victoria; Scharfstein, David
  作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
• Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games AI翻译
  作者：Wang, Joseph Tao-yi; Spezio, Michael; Camerer, Colin F.
  作者单位：National Taiwan University; California Institute of Technology; Claremont Colleges; Scripps College
  摘要：We report experiments on sender-receiver games with an incentive for senders to exaggerate. Subjects overcommunicate-messages are more informative of the true state than they should be, in equilibrium. Eyetracking shows that senders look at payoffs in a way that is consistent with a level-k model. A combination of sender messages and lookup patterns predicts the true state about twice as often as predicted by equilibrium. Using these measures to infer the state would enable receiver subjects t...
• Risk and Time Preferences: Linking Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam AI翻译
  作者：Tanaka, Tomomi; Camerer, Colin F.; Nguyen, Quang
  作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; California Institute of Technology; Universite Lyon 2; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis AI翻译
  作者：Mian, Atif; Sufi, Amir; Trebbi, Francesco
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of British Columbia
  摘要：We examine the effects of constituents, special interests, and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic history. Representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the Foreclosure Prevention Act, especially in competitive districts. Interestingly, representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Special interests in the form of higher campaign c...
• Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle AI翻译
  作者：Low, Hamish; Meghir, Costas; Pistaferri, Luigi
  作者单位：University of London; University College London; Yale University; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
  摘要：We specify a life-cycle model of consumption, labor supply and job mobility in an economy with search frictions. We distinguish different sources of risk, including shocks to productivity, job arrival, and job destruction. Allowing for job mobility has a large effect on the estimate of productivity risk. Increases in the latter impose a considerable welfare loss. Increases in employment risk have large effects on output and, primarily through this channel, affect welfare. The welfare value of ...
• The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks AI翻译
  作者：Romer, Christina D.; Romer, David H.
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
  摘要：This paper investigates the impact of tax changes on economic activity. We use the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and Congressional reports, to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar tax policy actions. This analysis allows us to separate legislated changes into those taken for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and those taken for more exogenous reasons. The behavior of output following these more exogenous changes indicates ...
• Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression AI翻译
  作者：Williamson, Oliver E.
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment AI翻译
  作者：Grosskopf, Brit; Sarin, Rajiv
  作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
  摘要：We investigate the impact of reputation in a laboratory experiment. We do so by varying whether the past choices of a long-run player are observable by the short-run players. Our framework allows for reputation to have either a beneficial or a harmful effect on the long-run player. We find that reputation is seldom harmful and its beneficial effects are not as strong as theory suggests. When reputational concerns are at odds with other-regarding preferences, we find the latter overwhelm the fo...
• Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements AI翻译
  作者：Lerner, Josh; Malmendier, Ulrike
  作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
  摘要：We analyze how contractibility affects contract design A major concern when designing research agreements is that researchers use their funding to subsidize other projects We show that, when research activities are not contractible, an option contract is optimal. The financing firm obtains the option to terminate the agreement and, in case of termination, broad property rights. The threat of termination deters researchers from cross-subsidization, and the cost of exercising the termination opt...