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作者:Ayguen, Orhan; Soenmez, Tayfun
作者单位:Boston College
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作者:Gibson, Rajna; Tanner, Carmen; Wagner, Alexander F.
作者单位:University of Geneva; University of Zurich; University of Zurich; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Harvard University
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作者:Peski, Marcin; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位:University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are repeatedly matched and decide whether or not to form profitable partnerships. Each agent has a physical color and a social color. An agent's social color acts as a signal, conveying information about the physical color of agents in his partnership history. Before an agent makes a decision, he observes his match's physical and social colors. Neither the physical color nor the social color is payoff relevant. We identify environments where equili...
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作者:McGarry, Kathleen
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
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作者:van Binsbergen, Jules; Brandt, Michael; Koijen, Ralph
作者单位:Northwestern University; Duke University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tilburg University
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作者:Card, David; Mas, Alexandre; Moretti, Enrico; Saez, Emmanuel
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Princeton University
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作者:Chaney, Thomas; Sraer, David; Thesmar, David
作者单位:University of Chicago; Princeton University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要:What is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment? In the presence of financing frictions, firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects. Through this collateral channel, shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggregate investment. To compute the sensitivity of investment to collateral value, we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms that own real estate. Over the 1993-2007 period, the repr...
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作者:Gilchrist, Simon; Zakrajsek, Egon
作者单位:Boston University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Bartling, Bjoern; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M.
作者单位:University of Zurich; University of Munich
摘要:High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, and screening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emerge endogenously in our experiments: bad jobs wit...
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作者:Blanes i Vidal, Jordi; Draca, Mirko; Fons-Rosen, Christian
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Warwick; Pompeu Fabra University