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作者：Holmstrom, Bengt
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Incentives are often associated with narrow financial rewards such as bonuses or executive stock options. But in general such rewards are just a small part of the design of incentives. Properly designed incentive systems have to take into account the full portfolio of activities that the agent can engage in, the array of instruments, many nonfinancial, that are available to influence individuals and consider the factors that motivate them in different settings. Thinking about incentives as a s...
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作者：Sieg, Holger; Yoon, Chamna
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：This paper shows how to identify and estimate, using standard semi-parametric techniques, a class of dynamic games with perfect monitoring, that have been at the frontier of recent research in political economy. The empirical analysis provides novel quantitative insights into the trade-off that voters face between ideology and ability, the differences in ability and ideology among parties and states, and the differences in preferences between political candidates and voters. We analyze the con...
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作者：Hornbeck, Richard; Keniston, Daniel
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
摘要：Urban growth requires the replacement of outdated buildings, yet growth may be restricted when landowners do not internalize positive spillover effects from their own reconstruction. The Boston Fire of 1872 created an opportunity for widespread simultaneous reconstruction, initiating a virtuous circle in which building upgrades encouraged further upgrades of nearby buildings. Land values increased substantially among burned plots and nearby unburned plots, capitalizing economic gains comparabl...
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作者：Athey, Susan; Imbens, Guido; Pham, Thai; Wager, Stefan
作者单位：Stanford University; Columbia University
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作者：Auclert, Adrien; Rognlie, Matthew
作者单位：Stanford University; Princeton University
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作者：Berazneva, Julia; Byker, Tanya S.
作者单位：Middlebury College; Middlebury College
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作者：Collins, Courtney A.; Kaplan, Erin K.
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作者：Heissel, Jennifer A.
作者单位：Northwestern University
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作者：Tri Vi Dang; Gorton, Gary; Holmstroem, Bengt; Ordonez, Guillermo
作者单位：Columbia University; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Banks produce short-term debt for transactions and storing value. The value of this debt must not vary over time so agents can easily trade it at par like money. To produce money-like safe liquidity, banks keep detailed information about their loans secret, reducing liquidity if needed to prevent agents from producing costly private information about the banks' loans. Capital markets involve information revelation, so they produce risky liquidity. The trade-off between less safe liquidity and ...
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Kremer, Ilan; Perry, Motty
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick
摘要：An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditio...
