斯坦福商学院

AbstractThis paper analyzes interactions between corporate governance and law enforce ment practices, focusing on cases where deterrence is weak and harmful miscon duct is profitable. We show how managerial compensation contracts, including stock-based compensation and insurance that shields managers from liability, systematically undermine enforcement efforts aimed both at the corporation and at managers. We also show that common enforce

In March, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink said he’d like to see more individual investors get access to private assets that have long been “locked behind high walls, with gates that open only for the wealthiest or largest market participants.” That’s a tempting prospect for retail investors who’d like to get the same kinds of returns as billionaires and hedge funds. And private equity firms are increasingly eager to give ordinary Americans the chance to

Research SummaryWe investigate why firms imitating the same competitor’s strategy in the same environment often replicate different components of that strategy. We argue that such divergence can arise because firms vary in the internal interdependencies that underlie their strategies. When a firm significantly differs from a competitor in how one component of its strategy interacts with other components, the consequences of replicating the c

AbstractThis research examines how the movements an interface requires of a consumer—that is, its “kinesthetic properties”—can alter what a consumer attends to when responding and in turn change the response itself. We compare the kinesthetic properties of two ubiquitous scale formats: slider and radio-button scales. Six studies (plus four in the web appendix) show dragging a slider (vs. clicking a radio button) elicits responses that are closer