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作者：Clayton, Christopher; Maggiori, Matteo; Schreger, Jesse
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University; Columbia University
摘要：Governments use their countries' economic strength from financial and trade relationships to achieve geopolitical and economic goals. We provide a model of the sources of geoeconomic power and how it is wielded. The source of this power is the ability of a hegemonic country to coordinate threats across disparate economic relationships as a means of enforcement on foreign entities. The hegemon wields this power to demand costly actions out of the targeted entities, including mark-ups, import re...
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作者：Lipman, Barton
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作者：Hsiao, Allan
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Weak environmental regulation has global consequences. When domestic regulation fails, the international community can target emitters with trade policy. I develop a dynamic empirical framework for evaluating trade policy as a substitute for domestic regulation, and I apply the framework to the market for palm oil, a major driver of deforestation and global CO2 emissions. Relative to business as usual, a domestic production tax of 50% reduces CO2 emissions by 7.4 Gt from 1988 to 2016, amountin...
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作者：Halac, Marina
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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms-such as pure bundling or separate sales-can be far from optimal and do not admit clear-cut comparisons. We show that this changes if the monopolist has sufficiently precise information about the buyer's valuations: Now, pure bundling always outperforms separate sales; moreover, there is a sense in which p...
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作者：Heikkuri, Vesa-matti; Schief, Matthias
作者单位：Tampere University; Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD)
摘要：We derive a novel decomposition of the Gini coefficient into within- and between-group inequality terms that sum to the aggregate Gini coefficient. This decomposition is derived from a set of axioms that ensure desirable behavior for the within- and between-group inequality terms. The decomposition of the Gini coefficient is unique given our axioms, easy to compute, and can be interpreted geometrically.
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the problem of a partisan gerrymanderer who assigns voters to equipopulous districts to maximize his party's expected seat share. The designer faces both aggregate, district-level uncertainty (how many votes his party will receive) and idiosyncratic, voter-level uncertainty (which voters will vote for his party). Segregate-pair districting, where weaker districts contain one type of voter, while stronger districts contain two, is optimal for the gerrymanderer. The optimal form of segr...
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作者：de Ridder, Maarten; Grassi, Basile; Morzenti, Giovanni
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University; Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：Macroeconomic outcomes depend on the distribution of markups across firms and over time, making firm-level markup estimates key for macroeconomic analysis. Methods to obtain these estimates require data on the prices that firms charge. Firm-level data with wide coverage, however, primarily come from financial statements, which lack information on prices. We use an analytical framework to show that trends in markups over time or the dispersion of markups across firms can still be well-measured ...
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作者：Lipman, Barton
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Reny, Philip J.; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Chicago; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence in first-price auctions with private values that accommodate non quasi-linear utilities and value-distributions that contain atoms and exhibit positive or negative correlation. These conditions show that equilibrium existence often turns on properties of a single statistic of the joint distribution of values, namely, the minimum value in the support of the high-value distribution (the mHV). We also show that modifying the standard tie-...
