The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolotilin, Anton; Wolitzky, Alexander
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23609
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: representation; BIAS; equilibrium; COMPETITION; CHOICE; MODEL

摘要

We study the problem of a partisan gerrymanderer who assigns voters to equipopulous districts to maximize his party's expected seat share. The designer faces both aggregate, district-level uncertainty (how many votes his party will receive) and idiosyncratic, voter-level uncertainty (which voters will vote for his party). Segregate-pair districting, where weaker districts contain one type of voter, while stronger districts contain two, is optimal for the gerrymanderer. The optimal form of segregate-pair districting depends on the designer's popularity and the relative amounts of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. When idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates, a designer with majority support pairs all voters, while a designer with minority support segregates opposing voters and pairs more favorable voters; these plans resemble uniform districting and packing-and-cracking, respectively. When aggregate uncertainty dominates, the designer segregates moderate voters and pairs extreme voters; this matching slices plan has received some attention in the literature. Estimating the model using precinct-level returns from recent U.S. House elections shows that, in practice, idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates. We discuss implications for redistricting reform, political polarization, and detecting gerrymandering. Methodologically, we exploit a formal connection between gerrymandering-partitioning voters into districts-and information design-partitioning states of the world into signals.