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作者：Grigoryan, Aram
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The continuum matching model has been instrumental in the studies of finite economies. Yet, there is limited theoretical justification on whether and when a continuum model approximates large finite problems. In this paper, I study the following question: if we randomly sample finite economies from some distribution, will the stable assignments of these finite economies converge to a stable assignment of the continuum economy as we increase the sample size? I provide a simple condition, which ...
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作者：Rosenthal, Maxwell
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper studies a moral hazard problem in which the principal does not know the agent's beliefs about the output generating process. The agent is risk neutral, transfers are subject to limited liability, and the principal evaluates contracts according to their worst-case payoff against a rich set of plausible agent beliefs. With common knowledge of the relationship between effort and expected output, optimal contracts are of the form w(y)=max(alpha y + beta,0). With or without common knowle...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Rehbeck, John
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Models of stochastic choice typically use conditional choice probabilities given menus as the primitive for analysis, but in the field these are often hard to observe. We consider the case where an analyst has access to a marginal stochastic choice dataset containing the marginal distributions of available menus and of choices, but not to conditional choice frequencies. The Random Utility Model (RUM) has no testable implications for such datasets, but any restriction on the domain of feasible ...
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作者：Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：I study strategic transmission of verifiable information through intermediaries, and find that equilibrium full disclosure requires that all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. By embedding this strategic disclosure game into networks, I explore the intersection of information transmission in networks and strategic communication-two major economic theory research strands. When each networked player may hold information useful for any other's decision, I fin...
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作者：Sanktjohanser, Anna
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：I consider a model of reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. There are two types of players: rational and stubborn. The game has two stages: a demand stage and a concession stage. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium for any fixed probability of facing a stubborn type. When the probability of facing a stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium for either type. When the probability is large, there is either immedi...
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作者：Kostadinov, Rumen
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：I study a dynamic model of durable-good monopoly where the seller minimizes lifetime regret against the worst-case type of buyer. The optimal mechanism is time consistent: at no point can the seller benefit from replacing it with another mechanism. Despite this, the optimal mechanism cannot be supported in an equilibrium without commitment. This is because the seller's regret is endogenously determined by the best counterfactual payoffs he can obtain against every type, and these payoffs vary ...
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作者：Kubler, Felix; Selden, Larry; Wei, Xiao
作者单位：University of Zurich; Columbia University; Fudan University; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
摘要：For general choice spaces, standard dynamic preference models cannot simultaneously satisfy the properties of time consistency, the separation of time and risk preferences, and the ability to accommodate an indifference to the timing of when risk is resolved. In the context of a consumption-portfolio choice problem often underlying asset pricing and macro models, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions such that all three properties are satisfied. We also show that quantitatively reasona...
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作者：Greinecker, Michael; Nielsen, Michael
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We show with a counterexample that Theorem 1 of Can intergenerational equity be operationalized? is wrong. The problem with Theorem 1 does not affect the remaining results of the paper, which form its core.
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作者：Hu, Gaoji; Li, Jiangtao; Quah, John K-H.; Tang, Rui
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Singapore Management University; National University of Singapore; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We propose a novel concept of rationalization, called coarse rationalization, tailored for the analysis of datasets where an agent's choices are imperfectly observed. We characterize those datasets, which are rationalizable in this sense and present an efficient algorithm to verify the characterizing condition. We then demonstrate how our results can be applied through a duality approach to test the rationalizability of datasets with perfectly observed choices but imprecisely observed linear b...
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作者：Mekonnen, Teddy
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper examines when the public provision of information in search markets improves welfare. I consider a two-sided frictional search market in which buyers match with vertically differentiated sellers. The market is segmented into submarkets based on seller types. Such segmentation serves as a public signal that buyers use to direct their search. Given a segmentation, I characterize both the socially efficient and the equilibrium allocation of buyers across submarkets, and identify a Hosi...
