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作者：Laiho, Tuomas; Murto, Pauli; Salmi, Julia
作者单位：Aalto University; Hanken School of Economics
摘要：We introduce a collective experimentation problem where a continuum of agents choose the timing of irreversible actions under uncertainty and where public feedback from the actions arrives gradually over time. The leading application is the adoption of new technologies. The socially optimal expansion path entails an informational trade-off where acting today speeds up learning but postponing capitalizes on the option value of waiting. We contrast the social optimum to the decentralized equilib...
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作者：Combe, Julien; Nora, Vladyslav; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Nazarbayev University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and ordinally efficient allocation rules coincide with spot mechanisms. The latter specify virtual prices for items at each date and, for each agent, randomly select a budget of virtual money at the beginning of...
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作者：Xie, Haitian; Zhu, Ying; Shishkin, Denis
作者单位：Peking University; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The classic third degree price discrimination (3PD) model requires the knowledge of the distribution of buyer valuations and the covariate to set the price conditioned on the covariate. In terms of generating revenue, the classic result shows that 3PD is at least as good as uniform pricing. What if the seller has to set a price based only on a sample of observations from the underlying distribution? Is it still obvious that the seller should engage in 3PD? This paper sheds light on these funda...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：New York University; Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University
摘要：We study the standard reputation model with a long-run (LR) player facing a sequence of short-run (SR) opponents, with one difference: the SR players are uncertain about the monitoring structure, while the LR player knows it. We construct examples where the standard reputation result breaks down: Even if there is a possibility that the LR player is a commitment type who always plays the action to which he wants to commit, there exist bad equilibria in which the LR player gets payoffs substanti...
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作者：de Castro, Luciano; Galvao, Antonio F.; Nunes, Daniel
作者单位：University of Iowa; Michigan State University; Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA)
摘要：This paper studies a dynamic quantile model for intertemporal decisions under uncertainty, in which the decision maker maximizes the tau-quantile of the stream of future utilities, for tau is an element of (0,1). We present two sets of contributions. First, we generalize existing results in directions that are important for applications. In particular, the sets of choices and random shocks are general metric spaces, either connected or finite. Moreover, the future state is not exclusively dete...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies repeated trade with noisy information about previous transactions. A buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and buys goods from different sellers over time. Each seller observes a noisy history of signals about the buyer's previous purchases and sets a price. We compare the cases where previous prices are observable to sellers with the case where they are not. We show that, in both cases, more signal precision is counterbalan...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Muller, Stephan; Pourbabaee, Farzad; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Gottingen; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In contrast, too much condescension leads to worse outcomes, as does anti-condescension.
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：An extension rule assigns to each fractional tournament x (specifying, for every pair of social alternatives a and b, the proportion x ab of voters who prefer a to b) a random choice function y (specifying a collective choice probability distribution for each subset of alternatives), which chooses a from {a,b} with probability x ab.There exist multiple neutral and stochastically rationalizable extension rules. Both linearity (requiring that y be an affine function of x) and independence of irr...
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作者：Liu, Zehao; He, Ping; Xie, Chengbo
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Tsinghua University; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：Liquidity requirements for commercial banks improve risk-sharing for depositors. Nevertheless, shadow banks, issuing securities with lower liquidity, operate outside such regulatory constraints. In an economy featuring shadow banks with a constant level of liquidity for shadow bank securities, higher liquidity requirements lead to a reduction in aggregate liquidity provision, owing to regulatory arbitrage incentives. Conversely, when the liquidity of shadow bank securities decreases with the m...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Roorda, Berend; Yang, Jingni
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Twente; University of Sydney
摘要：We introduce and analyze expected balanced uncertain utility (EBUU) theory. A prior and a balanced outcome-set utility characterize an EBUU decision maker. Conditional on a reference or balancing value, the latter assigns a utility to each outcome-set. The decision maker associates with each act, its envelope, the minimal measurable mapping from states to outcome-sets that contains the act. She then (implicitly) ranks an act according to the balancing value at which the expected balanced utili...
