-
作者:Blauberger, Michael; Rittberger, Berthold
作者单位:University of Munich
摘要:European regulatory networks (ERNs) play a central role in the formulation, deliberation, and implementation of EU policies and have, thus, become objects of investigation in a fast-growing scholarly literature. We identify two shortcomings - one conceptual, one theoretical - in the literature on ERNs: First, we argue that the principal-agent approach, which is conventionally used to conceptualize ERNs, overlooks and even misrepresents central features of ERNs. By introducing and applying the ...
-
作者:Lavertu, Stephane
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要:Legislators are thought to delegate policymaking authority to administrative actors either to avoid blame for controversial policy or to secure policy outcomes. This study tests these competing perspectives and establishes that public attention to policymaking is a powerful predictor of the extent to which significant United States statutes delegate authority to the executive branch. Consistent with the policy-concerns perspective, by one calculation statutes dealing with high-attention issues...
-
作者:Distelhorst, Greg; Locke, Richard M.; Pal, Timea; Samel, Hiram
作者单位:University of Oxford; Brown University; European University Institute
摘要:Poor working conditions in global supply chains have led to private initiatives that seek to regulate labor practices in developing countries. But how effective are these regulatory programs? We investigate the effects of transnational private regulation by studying Hewlett-Packard's (HP) supplier responsibility program. Using analysis of factory audits, interviews with buyer and supplier management, and field research at production facilities across seven countries, we find that national cont...
-
作者:Gong, Ting; Zhou, Na
作者单位:City University of Hong Kong; Singapore Management University
摘要:The relationship between market liberalization and corruption has attracted scholarly attention in recent years. Conventional wisdom holds that increased economic marketization reduces corruption. China, however, provides evidence to the contrary; corruption has grown as its market-oriented reforms progress. This paradoxical co-development of the market and corruption begs the intriguing questions of how corruption has survived marketization and what explains the failure of government regulati...
-
作者:Mills, Russell W.; Koliba, Christopher J.
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Bowling Green State University; University of Vermont
摘要:A puzzle that faces public administrators within regulatory governance networks is how to balance the need for democratic accountability while increasingly facing demands from elected officials to optimize oversight of industry by utilizing the expertise of the private sector in developing risk-based standards for compliance. The shift from traditional command and control oversight to process oriented regulatory regimes has been most pronounced in highly complex industries, such as aviation an...