The challenge of accountability in complex regulatory networks: The case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mills, Russell W.; Koliba, Christopher J.
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Bowling Green State University; University of Vermont
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12062
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 77-91
• 关键词: management; PRIVATE; trust

摘要

A puzzle that faces public administrators within regulatory governance networks is how to balance the need for democratic accountability while increasingly facing demands from elected officials to optimize oversight of industry by utilizing the expertise of the private sector in developing risk-based standards for compliance. The shift from traditional command and control oversight to process oriented regulatory regimes has been most pronounced in highly complex industries, such as aviation and deepwater oil drilling, where the intricate and technical nature of operations necessitates risk-based regulatory networks based largely on voluntary compliance with mutually agreed upon standards. The question addressed in this paper is how the shift to process oriented regimes affects the trade-offs between democratic, market, and administrative accountability frames, and what factors determine the dominant accountability frame within the network. Using post-incident document analysis, this paper provides a case study of regulatory oversight of the deepwater oil drilling industry prior to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico, to explore how the shift to a more networked risk-based regulatory regime affects the trade-offs and dominant accountability frames within the network. The results of this study indicate that a reliance on market-based accountability mechanisms, along with the lack of a fully implemented process-oriented regulatory regime, led to the largest oil spill in US history.