For fear of popular politics? Public attention and the delegation of authority to the United States executive branch

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lavertu, Stephane
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12061
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 160-177
• 关键词: us federal-agencies; SALIENCE; ACCOUNTABILITY; bureaucracies; INDEPENDENCE; set

摘要

Legislators are thought to delegate policymaking authority to administrative actors either to avoid blame for controversial policy or to secure policy outcomes. This study tests these competing perspectives and establishes that public attention to policymaking is a powerful predictor of the extent to which significant United States statutes delegate authority to the executive branch. Consistent with the policy-concerns perspective, by one calculation statutes dealing with high-attention issues entail 48 percent fewer delegating provisions than statutes dealing with low-attention issues - a far stronger relationship than is typically found in the delegation literature. As per the blame-avoidance perspective, a number of additional analyses yield results consistent with the notion that fears about future public attention motivate statutory delegation if legislative conflict is sufficiently great. Overall, however, the results suggest that conflict typically is not sufficiently great and that legislators are generally more inclined to limit statutory delegation when the public is paying attention.