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作者：Connolly, Jennifer M.
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：A majority of US municipalities now operate under the council-manager form of government, an institutional design that creates a principal-agent problem as the elected council and appointed manager have divergent incentives. Although current scholarship on the council-manager relationship focuses on ex post municipal level outcomes, this study advances the literature by developing a theory of ex ante contracting between principal and agent at the local level. The theory predicts that increasin...
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作者：Kroll, Alexander
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University
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作者：Rauh, Jonathan
作者单位：University of North Carolina; East Carolina University
摘要：Ethics commissions address policies that are external to the policy maker, the enforcement of which may be damaging to the policymaker. Given this potential for harm it is likely that delegation to commissions is transactional with elected officials controlling autonomy based on a set of specific goals. The author tests this argument by examining how executive and legislative control of a commission's autonomy impacts the effectiveness of a commission's oversight. Findings suggest that elected...
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作者：Zhu, Ling
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：In this article, I explore the determinants of frontline service organizations' support for and implementation of social policy reforms in the context of the US national health care reform. Ascribing to theories of inter-organizational collaboration, I argue that local service organizations, as the frontline agents of policy changes, develop their policy preferences and implementation activities in accordance with the collaborative networks, in which they situated. Network participation reduce...
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作者：Jimenez, Benedict S.
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作者：Hollibaugh, Gary E., Jr.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Formal models of the appointments process typically cast the decision of the appointing executive as one where an open position is assumed and an appointee is chosen in order to maximize the utility of the executive (and perhaps that of the legislature if confirmation is required). However, several-often patronage-focused-processes within the appointments process focus instead on finding acceptable positions for necessary-to-place individuals. Here, I develop a model where the goal is to find ...
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作者：O'Brien, Daniel Tumminelli; Offenhuber, Dietmar; Baldwin-Philippi, Jessica; Sands, Melissa; Gordon, Eric
作者单位：Northeastern University; Harvard University; Fordham University
摘要：A central question for programs that involve constituents in the coproduction of government services is: what motivates constituents to participate? This study compares two perspectives on this question: the traditional public-as-citizen model treats participation as a function of a general civic disposition that extends to many forms of civic and political participation (e.g. volunteering and voting); and we introduce the public-as-partner model, which argues that a given program might rely o...
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作者：Nielsen, Poul A.; Moynihan, Donald P.
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Voters reward or punish politicians by deeming them responsible for positive and negative outcomes, but how, in turn, do politicians attribute responsibility to those who actually deliver public services? Inattention to this question renders incomplete current perspectives on democratic processes of accountability, even as politicians are increasingly provided with performance data to hold bureaucrats accountable. We shed light on this issue using a survey experiment of elected officials featu...
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作者：Skinner, Daniel
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio University
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作者：O'Toole, Laurence J., Jr.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
