Differing Goals of Limiting Autonomy: Legislatures, Governors, and State Ethics Commissions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rauh, Jonathan
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; East Carolina University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muw062
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 336-351
• 关键词: bootstrap confidence-intervals; 2-stage least-squares; CORRUPTION; INDEPENDENCE; bureaucracy; DISCRETION; expertise; capacity; coverage; set

摘要

Ethics commissions address policies that are external to the policy maker, the enforcement of which may be damaging to the policymaker. Given this potential for harm it is likely that delegation to commissions is transactional with elected officials controlling autonomy based on a set of specific goals. The author tests this argument by examining how executive and legislative control of a commission's autonomy impacts the effectiveness of a commission's oversight. Findings suggest that elected officials attempt to influence commissions in a strategic manner based upon whether they want to direct attention away from themselves or toward the other branch of government.