-
作者：Chan, Kwan Nok; Lam, Wai Fung
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：Standard models of bureaucratic control argue that politicians vulnerable to asymmetric information rely on third-party monitoring to expand information supply. This solution to information asymmetry assumes that politicians can process all information that comes their way. However, advocates strategically oversupply information to crowd out rivals, making such a solution counterproductive. Using data on administrative reorganization in Hong Kong, we examine the alternative proposition that bu...
-
作者：Carstensen, Martin B.; Matthijs, Matthias
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：How do ruling policy paradigms persist over time and why do they often undergo significant internal ideational changes? While the impact of Peter Hall's approach to policy paradigms on the study of governance has been immense, there is a burgeoning consensus that a Kuhnian understanding of paradigms makes punctuated equilibrium style shifts the only game in town. While Hall's approach can account for inter-paradigm change with reference to exogenous shocks, it does not allow for significant id...
-
作者：Corbett, Jack; Grube, Dennis C.; Lovell, Heather; Scott, Rodney
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of Cambridge; University of Tasmania; Australian Defense Force Academy; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The ability of the civil service to act as a reservoir of institutional memory is central to the pragmatic task of governing. But there is a growing body of scholarship that suggests the bureaucracy is failing at this core task. In this article, we distinguish between two different ways of thinking about institutional memory: one static and one dynamic. In the former, memory is singular and held in document form, especially by files and procedures. In the latter, memories reside with people an...
-
作者：Schnell, Sabina
作者单位：Syracuse University
摘要：Why do tainted politicians in high-corruption countries adopt transparency and anti-corruption policies that risk exposing their wrongdoing? Using the cases of freedom of information and public asset disclosure in Romania, we assess three explanations: that these policies are meant to be mere window dressing, facilitate bottom-up monitoring, or ensure access to information for the ruling party if it loses power. We find that decision makers adopt transparency and anti-corruption policies becau...
-
作者：Federman, Peter Stanley
作者单位：University of Kansas
-
作者：Andrews, M.
-
作者：Bussell, Jennifer
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Corruption is a persistent problem in developing countries, and recent scholarship suggests that middlemen play an important role in corrupt acts. Yet, while intermediaries can reduce transaction costs in illicit exchange, they also increase agency costs and reduce benefits to others. The involvement of middlemen may thus vary. I argue that middlemen are most likely to engage in, and benefit from, the subset of corruption transactions that are repeated frequently, but not by the same parties. ...
-
作者：Han, Yao
作者单位：Tsinghua University; University College Dublin; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
-
作者：Fernandez, Sergio; Koma, Samuel; Lee, Hongseok
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Pretoria; University of Johannesburg
摘要：Representative bureaucracy is a critical element of modern public administration and governance. Since the advent of nonracial democracy, the South African government has transformed the apartheid bureaucracy into a new public service that closely mirrors the country's diverse population. Questions remain, however, about how this demographic transformation has impacted the public service. Grounded in the theory of representative bureaucracy, we use a mixed methods approach to examine the relat...
-
作者：Davies, Cleo
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
