Cheap talk or incredible commitment? (Mis)calculating transparency and anti-corruption

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schnell, Sabina
• 署名单位: Syracuse University
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12298
• 发表日期: 2018
• 关键词: party competition; policy feedback; POLITICS; romania; implementation; disclosure; DEMOCRACY; Bulgaria; adoption; access

摘要

Why do tainted politicians in high-corruption countries adopt transparency and anti-corruption policies that risk exposing their wrongdoing? Using the cases of freedom of information and public asset disclosure in Romania, we assess three explanations: that these policies are meant to be mere window dressing, facilitate bottom-up monitoring, or ensure access to information for the ruling party if it loses power. We find that decision makers adopt transparency and anti-corruption policies because they want to signal their integrity and because they underestimate their consequences. Because they assume they will be able to control implementation, decision makers discount the potential costs of damaging information being released. Sustained political competition can keep corruption and lack of transparency on the public and political agenda, shifting attention from policy adoption to implementation and leading to increased compliance. Since politicians miscalculate the consequences of their actions, signals that are intended to be cheap can end up being quite costly.